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Conference Foreword 
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who took the time to review papers for the conference, irrespective of the fact that they are unable 
to attend this year.  
 
To our sponsors and supporters a vote of thanks for both the financial and moral support provided 
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DETECTING AND TRACING SLOW ATTACKS ON MOBILE PHONE 
USER SERVICE 
 
Brian Cusack, Zhuang Tian 
Digital Forensic Research Laboratories, AUT 
brian.cusack@aut.ac.nz, zhuang_tian@hotmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
The lower bandwidth of mobile devices has until recently filtered the range of attacks on the Internet. However, 
recent research shows that DOS and DDOS attacks, worms and viruses, and a whole range of social engineering 
attacks are impacting on broadband smartphone users. In our research we have developed a metric-based system to 
detect the traditional slow attacks that can be effective using limited resources, and then employed combinations of 
Internet trace back techniques to identify sources of attacks. Our research question asked: What defence 
mechanisms are effective? We critically evaluate the available literature to appraise the current state of the 
problem area and then propose an innovative solution for the detection and investigation of attacks.    
Keywords:  Slow Attacks, Detection, Trace back, Mobile, Communications 
INTRODUCTION 
There have been known security incidents of DDoS involving Mobile devices. For instance, September 2015, 
researchers from CloudFlare reported that a DDoS attack peaked at over 275,000 HTTP requests per second and 
resulted in 4.5 billion hits on the targeted website. This was blamed on a malicious advertising that compromised up 
to 650,000 Smartphones (Murdock, 2015, p.1). An update (2016) notes that these attacks spike during the weekend, 
they are very large in size, and that these attacks are no longer targeted only at high profile websites but also at 
mobile services. 3G technologies use IP technologies for control and transport; and, require cross network service 
collaborations, multi-vendor, and a multi-domain environment in order to gratify a wide variety of needs. This 
relationship requires Internet-based data and data from the cellular network in order to provide services to wireless 
users (Kotapati, et al., 2005, p.631). Bailey et al. (2009) reported that smart devices were responsible for generating 
14 times more traffic than a non-smart device. As a result, the cellular networks have made tremendous 
improvements in order to meet the demands for increased bandwidth and communication requirements (Anstee et 
al., 2013). According to Farina et al. (2014), the 4G connections are responsible for generating six times more 
traffic than non 4G connections. However, globally, mobile data traffic reached 3.7 Exabyte per month in 2015; 
making mobile data traffic grow 4,000-fold over the past 10 years and almost 400-million-fold over the past 15 
years. Smart devices represented 36 percent of mobile device connections globally in 2015. This accounted for 89 
percent of mobile data traffic in which 55 percent was mobile video traffic. Consequently our paper acknowledges 
the trends but addresses the traditional slow attack that works with all mobile devices of any bandwidth (Farina et 
al., 2016). 
The new venture between the two different technologies introduces new vulnerabilities and exposes the users on the 
cellular network to a range of additional risks across the new surface (Ricciato, et al., 2010, p.553).The introduction 
and growth of usages of technologies such as 4G/LTE and its high bandwidth has increased the pervasive nature of 
access points to the network. It is therefore evident mobile devices constitute not only a new target of an attack but 
also it has the capability to execute an attack (Farina, et al., 2016, p.269). Contact lists stored on mobile devices can 
be used to spread malware and infect other devices (Plohmann, et al., 2011, p.133). A DoS/DDoS attack has 
evolved from flooding strategies to low bandwidth tactics that employ slow techniques and can operate in all 
bandwidths. The purpose of this Slow DoS techniques is to lower the amount of bandwidth and resources that are 
required to execute an attack. The slow techniques have been adopted and used against devices such as mobile 
phones and game stations (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.195). While most of the packets sent to the target node in a 
flooding DoS attack may be useless but, in a low-rate attack, almost all of the packets play a role in the success of 
the attack. Therefore, the low-rate DoS will force the victim to process only the attack packets. There is not yet an 
effective tool to address an efficient detection method in relation to slow-rate DoS (p.197). 
In this paper, we present an innovative technique to detect this kind of attack on mobile devices and also the use of 
multiple digital forensics methods to trace back the attack to its origin through the internet. The paper is designed to 
define slow attacks and to demonstrate our detection metric. We then present a flow diagram for investigation of 
slow attacks. The discussion on trace back reviews some of the previous and current literature in the field and draws 
the conclusion that two techniques working together are better than one on its own. We conclude by discussing 
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these claims and suggesting that slow attacks can be detected and managed to prevent loss of service to mobile 
phone users. 
LOW RESOURCE ATTACKS 
Low resource attacks rely on drip feeding malicious packets into a system. These techniques are often described as 
being slow because they are in contrast to flooding which rushes multiple packets through high bandwidth 
connections (Gilad and Herzberg, 2012). In contrast a low resource attack slowly drips malicious packets into a 
system such as a mobile phone where the victim processes every packet. Figure 1 shows the protocols which are 
open for exploitation by low resource slow attacks. The key element in each protocol is the ability for the attacker to 
slow down the attack packet by packet and to exploit the protocol mechanisms. Slow HTTP attacks, for example, 
rely on the fact that the HTTP protocol, by design, requires requests to be completely received by the server before 
they are processed. If an http request is not complete, or if the transfer rate is very low, the server keeps its resources 
busy waiting for the rest of the data. If the server keeps too many resources busy, this creates a denial of service. 
Table 1. Protocols for slow attack. 
 
 
 
These types of attack are easy to execute because a single machine is able to establish thousands of connections to a 
server and generate thousands of unfinished HTTP requests in a very short period of time using minimal bandwidth. 
Due to implementation differences among various HTTP servers, two main attack vectors exist (Cambiaso, et al., 
2012): 
 Slowloris: Slowing down HTTP headers, making the server wait for the final CRLF, which indicates the 
end of the headers section; and, 
 Slow POST: Slowing down the HTTP message body, making the server wait until all content arrives 
according to the Content-Length header; or until the final CRLF arrives, where if HTTP 1.1 is being used 
and no Content-Length was declared. 
These attacks can just look like requests that are taking a long time, so it’s hard to detect and prevent them by using 
traditional anti-DoS tools. In low resource conditions these attacks are effective because it does not require a large 
number of packets to create the effect. A defence against such an attack can be made by the following actions: 
 Reject / drop connections with HTTP methods not supported by the URL. 
 Limit the header and message body to a minimal reasonable length. Set tighter URL-specific limits as 
appropriate for every resource that accepts a message body. 
 Set an absolute connection timeout nearing in mind that if the timeout is too short, you risk dropping 
legitimate slow connections; and if it’s too long, you don’t get any protection from attacks. A timeout 
value slightly greater than median lifetime of connections should satisfy most of the legitimate clients. 
 The backlog of pending connections allows the server to hold connections it’s not ready to accept, and this 
allows it to withstand a larger slow HTTP attack, as well as gives legitimate users a chance to be served 
under high load. However, a large backlog also prolongs the attack, since it backlogs all connection 
requests regardless of whether they’re legitimate. If the server supports a backlog, make it reasonably large 
so your HTTP server can handle a small attack.  
 Define the minimum incoming data rate, and drop connections that are slower than that rate. Care must be 
taken not to set the minimum too low, or you risk dropping legitimate connections. 
However, these actions provide some protection but they do not signal a slow attack is taking place – which we 
address by innovation in the next section. 
DETECTING ATTACKS 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is simple but a very powerful technique of attack that disrupts service (Hadiks 
et al., 2014). The recent rapid proliferation and development of mobile technologies has also led to the exploitation 
for service disruption (Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.292). New techniques have also been developed to exploit 
the capacities and the characteristics of the service. This is where the DoS attack known as Low-rate DoS/DDoS 
attacks has evolved (Wang et al., 2007). Low-rate DDoS sends attack traffic periodically to the target device which 
makes it hard to detect amongst the normal traffic (Cambiaso et al., 2012). Various techniques for detection of the 
traditional flooding DDoS has been discussed in the literature. This section is designed to define and propose the 
Protocols HTTP, HTTPS, ICMP, TCP, UDP, 
SYN, IRC 
Attributes Time interval 
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use of the distance based similarity metric to detect a Low-rate DDoS attack. The metric has been used in other 
contexts by Riccardio et al. (2010) who proposed a Similarity of Attack Intentions (SAI) to estimate the similarity 
of cybercrime intentions for network forensics. Another study found that using self-similarity algorithm to detect 
flooding DDoS attacks (Yu, 2014b). It has been used as the method for link predictions that compare one data set 
with another. For instance, x and y is assigned a score Sxy which can be defined as proximity or similarity between x 
and y (Yu, 2014a). The Similarity metric can be used in a more skilled approach such as using node attributes to 
define their similarity (Yu, 2014c). Similarity has been used also to evaluate distances between nodes. The shorter 
the path between nodes, the more similar they are (Snoeren et al., 2012). Distance based similarity metric is 
employed in this study to evaluate the similarity of the previous log file against the current log file in order to 
determine if a DDoS attack has occurred. Hadicks et al. (2014) argued that defining the problem will be the best 
way to fully understand the nature of the problem and what to match, i.e., what are the features to be used in 
matching; what are the constraints we have to consider; how to match, i.e., the matching process for achieving a 
consistent match; how to evaluate the match, i.e., define the similarity measure (p.3). The challenge in slow or low-
rate DoS/DDoS attack is to map the proximity between attacking packets for identification, and then to initiate trace 
back methods based on the identified packets. 
To evaluate the similarity between two different objects x and y, a distance metric known as Euclidean Distance 
(EU) is used. This metric can also be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2, 
…, yn}. In this case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as: 
=                                    
To apply this metric to a Web server or to a mobile device then the log files have to be isolated for analysis. Let L1 
and L2 be the existing log file and the current log file, respectively. Let xi represent each protocol used in the 
existing log and yi represent the protocol used in the current log, where i={1, 2, …, n} and n is the total number of 
protocols where, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}. For computational purposes the Euclidean distance can 
be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow:                                     
The normalized EU delivers a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects are identical 
and a value other than 1 means that the two objects are not identical. Consequently the analysis focuses upon the 
discrimination between two known log files. The differential will indicate changes that can inform the alert of an 
attack. For the DDoS attack various protocols can be engaged in an attack (see figure 1). In order to detect an attack, 
the similarity between the existing and the current log files are ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance between 
L1 and L2 is calculated by using the first equation and then the similarity can be ranked based on the second 
equation. Table 1 provides a worked example of the detection metrics being applied to a sample set of mobile attack 
data that was downloaded from the Internet to illustrate the use of the detection system. It is a simple case of 
calculating the distance based similarity of various protocols that were used in the attack. The sample data was 
taken from a live attack and then processed. Once the attack has been detected, the protocol that was engaged in the 
attack needs to be identified. This data in Table 2 shows in the S row that only one ICMP sample was the same. The 
variations in the other protocols indicates that an attack is occurring through them.  
INVESTIGATING SLOW ATTACKS 
Mobile forensics is defined as the science of recovering digital evidences from a mobile device under forensically 
sound conditions using accepted methods (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). Mobile forensics investigation process 
consist of 15 phases that are divided into three main processes. The initialization process, the acquisition processes 
Table 2.  A simple case of distance based similarity ranking. 
Protocols HTTP HTTPS ICMP TCP UDP SYN IRC 
L1 x1=1000 x2=800 x3=600 x4=2000 x5=5000 x6=6000 x7=200 
L2 y1=21000 y2=1000 y3=600 y4=3000 y5=7000 y6=1000 y7=500 
EU(L1, L2) 20000 200 0 1000 2000 5000 300 
S 0.00005 0.004 1 0.001 0.0005 0.0002 0.03 
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and the investigative processes. (Omeleze and Venter, 2013, p.5). The investigative processes consists of six 
processes.  The Potential digital evidence acquisition, digital evidence examination and analysis, digital evidence 
interpretation, reporting, presentation and investigation closure (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). The processes 
employed in this study only concern the examination and analysis phase. The results will be used to determine a 
slow attack first and then initiate trace back the potential location of the attacker (Curran, et al., 2010; Omeleze et 
al., 2013). These processes were designed not only to eliminate the irrelevant data but assure the admissibility of the 
evidence in the court of law (Jansen, et al., 2007). The mobile forensics analysis process as illustrated in figure 1 
starts with the data acquired from the victim’s device. The data is used together with the reports from the similarity 
distance detection metric they can be calculated as a continuous live process or from previous log data. 
Identify similarity 
results from the 
image data
Image from mobile 
device
Report from 
similarity detection
Similarity in 
the data
NO
YES
StorageAnalyse packet 
headers according to 
similarity results
Extract source IP 
addreses
Further analysis & 
start reconstructing 
the attack path
Found 
evidence?
NO
YES
Prepare reportEND
START
 
  
Figure 1. Mobile Low-rate DDoS forensics investigation process 
Figure 1 assumes the common forensic soundness criteria are applied to correlate practice management by 
answering the questions: What meaning can be extracted from the evidence? What are the potential error factors? 
What are the training requirements for forensic practitioners? The model was developed to systematise processes 
while we investigated a number of slow attacks. 
TRACEBACK 
Traditional trace back methods are well-established for the Internet and broadband devices. The evidence presented 
in the introduction to this paper suggests that the majority of mobile phones are not broadband but the broadband 
phones produced most of the traffic. In addition all phones have some form of connectivity to the Internet. 
Therefore it is our argument that we can evaluate the traditional trace back methods and select the ones that are most 
appropriate for tracing back slow attacks. One reason that spoofing is often facilitated in these and other DoS or 
DDoS attacks is that it allows evasion of filters and quotas based on sender IP address, making tracing attackers 
harder (Devasundaram et al., 2006). Yu (2014b) reinforces that tracking back to the attack origin in DDoS attacks is 
a difficult and non-trivial problem due to the following reasons. Firstly, it is easy to forge or modify IP address (e.g. 
IP spoofing). Secondly, the stateless nature of IP routing, where routers normally know only the next hop for 
forwarding a packet instead of the entire end to end path taken by each packet, makes IP traceback even harder. 
Moreover, the Internet was originally designed for fast file sharing in a trusted environment and the network 
security was less important than communications, as it was a secondary consideration. Routers do not verify the 
source address of IP packets and the entire routing table is constructed on a trust basis. However, there are 
methodologies they can trace back to the last router from single packets. These methods can also be applied to trace 
back slow attacks, packet by packet (Goodrich, 2008). 
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A number of trace back methodologies can be rejected because they are impractical or too costly to implement. 
With slow attacks we are dealing with single packets or periodic clustered dispersions which are drip fed into a 
system to compromise devices. The metric can detect these time based malicious packets and once an alert sounded, 
trace back methods can be employed. A slow Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be characterized as an attack with 
the purpose of preventing legitimate users from using some specific network utilities such as a website, web service 
or computer system (Hadiks et al., 2014). It is also a coordinated attack on the availability of the service of a given 
target system or network. It can be launched indirectly through many compromised computing systems. The 
websites or other mobile devices used to launch the attack are often called the ‘secondary victims’ (Izaddoost et al., 
2007). The use of secondary victims in a slow DDoS attack provides an attacker with the ability to launch a much 
larger and more disruptive attack than a slow DoS attack while remaining anonymous since the secondary victims 
actually complete the attack, and hence make it more difficult for the digital forensic investigator (DFI) to track 
down the original attacker. In general, there are two types of standard attacks (Leavitt, 2005): direct and reflector 
attacks. In a direct attack, an attacker sends attack packets directly towards the victims. Attack packets can be any of 
the protocols in figure 1. (Kumar et al., 2011). In each attack on a mobile device a variety of networks are being 
used. The first instance it may be a Wi-Fi connection, or a direct cellular signal, or any other wireless protocol. 
Although it may be theoretically possible to trace back in IP address and practice there are too many mediating 
factors, including spoofing, dynamic IP, and other obfuscations. However at the packet level the packets carry 
information regarding the pathway they have taken. For example the ICMP protocol can hold information regarding 
at least the last two or three services it transacted through routers. Hence, in particular for mobile devices connected 
to a wireless router trace back progress can be made. 
Table 3. Comparison of Traceback Methods 
Traceback Method Hop Count 
Filtering  
ICMP  Logging  Marking  Marking 
& 
Logging  
TTL & 
Marking  
FDDA 
 
ISP Involvement None Low Moderate Low None None None  
No. of Attack 
Packets needed for 
traceback 
1 Very 
Large 
1 Very 
Large 
1 Very 
Large 
large 
Processing Overhead Very Low Low Low Low Very 
Low 
Low High 
Storage Very Low Low Low High High High High 
Ease of 
Implementation 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Scalability Highest High Fair High High Highest Highest 
Bandwidth Overhead None Low None None None High High 
No. of functions 
needed to implement 
3 2 3 2 5 5 6 
Ability to handle 
major DDOS attack 
Yes Yes Yes Poor Yes Yes Yes 
Classification IDS Based Proactive  IDS Based Proactive IDS 
Based 
Proactive IDS 
Based 
OSI Model Layer 
and Protocols 
IP, Network 
Layer 
ICMP, 
Network 
Layer 
IP, 
Network 
Layer 
IP, 
Network 
Layer 
IP, 
Network 
Layer 
IP, 
Network 
Layer 
IP, 
Network 
Layer 
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 The intermediate routers (routers between the source and destination) will generate a special ICMP packet 
according to the probability of 1 out of 20,000 once it receives an IP packet. The ICMP packet will be sent to either 
the source or the destination host with equal probability. The router’s path information is stored in the ICMP packet 
and is collected and analyzed at the destination host. With forward or back link information, two routers can be 
identified in the path; while with two links of information, three routers can be identified. Because only partial path 
information is contained in the ICMP packet, it will be extremely difficult to identify several attack paths under a 
flooding DDoS attack but for slow attacks the method is much more effective (Kumar et al., 2010). To consistently 
construct the full or partial path, the destination host has to match the original IP packet with its corresponding 
ICMP packet, and this can be difficult. However, if the ICMP method is used in conjunction with the hop count 
method then some of the obstacles to tracing back to the source of the malicious packets can be overcome. The 
basic idea of hop count filtering method is to identify spoofed IP packets by using the source OS address and the 
hop count value in the IP packet and the filter of the spoofed IP packet under DoS and DDoS attack. The rational is 
that most of spoofed IP packets do not carry hop count values that are consistent with the IP address being spoofed 
at victim’s device. Hence, an IP-to-hop-count (IP2HC) mapping table is built by the use of our metric during 
operations to distinguish between malicious and normal traffic. The simulation results show that close to 90% of 
spoofed traffic was identified (Paxson, 2001; Plohmann et al., 2011). Once an accurate IP2HC mapping table is 
built, the inspection algorithm checks the source IP address and the final time-to-live (TTL) value in each packet. 
The hop count method is not precisely an IP traceback method, since it cannot accurately pin point the attacking 
origin. It can only give a list of possible routers associating with an attacking origin. If all of the routers on the list 
form a circle, then the victim is the center and the hop count distance is the radius.  Coupled with the ICMP analysis 
these are the most effective ways to trace back a slow DoS/DDoS attack (Smoeren et al., 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
Detecting and tracing slow attacks on mobile phone user services is possible when combinations of methodologies 
are employed. We have demonstrated using dummy attack data from the web (Table 2) that our metric will detect 
and alert a slow denial of service attack from any of the protocols in Table 1. The review of trace back 
methodologies shows that many are not useful for slow attack but a combination of ICMP and the hop count 
methodologies can be effective by simply focusing on the packets. Disruption and other attacks will continue to 
grow on mobile devices of any bandwidth. Consequently, further research is required into detection, protection, and 
trace back methodologies in order to secure services. 
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Abstract  
Forensic investigations of digital devices is generally conducted on a seized device in a secure environment. 
This usually necessitates powering down the device and taking an image of the hard drive or semi-permanent 
storage in the case of solid state technology. Guidelines for forensic investigations of computers advise that the 
computer should be shut down by removing the power supply and thereby maintaining the hard disk in the state 
it was in whilst running. However, valuable forensic evidence often exists in the volatile memory which is lost 
when this process is followed. The issues of locked accounts on running computers and encrypted files present 
particular difficulties for forensic investigators who wish to capture a forensic image of the RAM. This research 
involves freezing RAM removed from a running computer so that it can later be reinserted into an unlocked 
computer allowing for a forensic image of the RAM to be captured. Three different methods of cooling the RAM 
are compared, along with varying delays in RAM reinsertion. The results provide a guideline for forensic 
investigators on how the issues with locked accounts and encryption may be overcome to record this valuable 
evidence that is otherwise lost. 
 
Keywords  
information security, RAM, forensics 
INTRODUCTION 
The forensic investigation of digital devices usually involves an investigator examining a cell phone, tablet of 
computer hard disk in a sterile environment. Guidelines for forensic investigators often advise that if a computer 
is running, it should be switched off at the power source to preserve the hard drive in its current state (National 
Institute of Justice 2008). One authoritative guide for forensic investigations suggested the need to preserve all 
evidence yet then suggested that power should be removed immediately from a running computer. This was 
corrected in a later version where a greater recognition of the value of evidence in the memory was recognised. 
(Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 2012). Shutting down the computer using the normal method will 
inevitably cause data to be written to the hard drive possibly overwriting valuable forensic evidence from 
deleted files (Vidas 2007). Whilst this method focusses on the potential forensic evidence on a hard drive, the 
Random Access Memory (RAM) is often overlooked as a source of forensic evidence. RAM may contain highly 
valuable forensic data such as web browsing history, programs that have been recently run or werecurrently 
running and usernames and passwords in unencrypted form (Halderman, Schoen et al. 2009). This highly 
valuable and useful information will be lost the instant power is switched off to the computer (Simon and Slay 
2009).   
It is fairly trivial to insert a USB drive with the required software to download the contents of RAM on to an 
external drive for later analysis. Whilst often this is not done, the fact that RAM may contain several gigabytes 
of valuable forensic evidence means that evidence is lost because the forensic investigator has not considered 
this area to be valuable to an investigation. One problem that may arise for an investigator is that of a computer 
that has been locked by the user and requires a password to unlock the user account. Whilst this may not present 
a problem in recovering hard drive evidence, the shutting down of the computer will permanently delete the 
volatile evidence in memory. Another significant issue that has surfaced in recent years for forensic 
investigators is the increasing use of cryptographic tools to encrypt files or entire hard drives. The cryptography 
is generally robust enough to withstand all attempts at finding the encryption key required to unlock this 
evidence. A securely encrypted drive means that evidence can be seized but that it simply cannot be read 
rendering it useless. 
This research examines the area of RAM forensics as an important source of digital forensic evidence for 
investigators. Methods of freezing RAM are utilised to compare the retention of data within the RAM utilising 
three different methods. Results are then compared so that guidelines for forensic investigators are presented 
allowing recovery of RAM contents using these methods. 
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STATE OF THE ART 
The physical address space consists of all valid physical memory addresses that are readable by the CPU (Intel 
Corporation 2013). The Memory Management Unit (MMU) acts as an intermediary between the operating 
system and the memory so that any attempt at acquiring the contents of RAM will require the utilised software 
to overcome restrictions created by the MMU. Whilst the utilisation of address spaces may vary across 
architectures and operating systems, the address spaces in RAM are all potentially accessible through 
specialised software.  
The layout of the physical address space in RAM is finalised upon completion of the copying of firmware code 
from ROM to RAM (Salihun 2012). Once this is complete, the RAM is ready for use by the operating system. 
Some forensic guidelines suggest photographing a computer screen and then switching the computer off at the 
power supply but forensic investigators are often aware of the valuable evidence contained in RAM and suggest 
performing a memory dump prior to powering off the system (Ligh, Case et al. 2014). Whilst a memory dump 
of RAM should provide all contents of RAM, it is possible that memory smear may occur because of the time 
taken to acquire the RAM contents (Vömel and Freiling 2012).  Memory smear occurs when memory is copied 
from RAM to a physical media and during this process some errors occur because of the time taken for the 
acquisition. This results in minor differences between the RAM contents and the RAM image so that whilst a 
100% match of the contents is hoped for, often the image falls slightly below a 100% match.  
To overcome this problem, a hardware-based approach using a Firewire connection can be utilised which 
provides more direct access to RAM, decreasing the error rate to the point that often a 100% match can be 
achieved (Huebner, Bem et al. 2007). If the Firewire approach is not feasible and the computer is running a 
Windows operating system, then 2 other methods may provide greater reliability than a memory dump (Ruff 
2008). Firstly, intentionally crashing the operating system will cause the RAM contents to be copied to the hard 
disk meaning a forensic acquisition of the hard disk should include most, if not all of the contents of RAM. The 
drawback to this method on a Windows Operating System is that the same computer must be rebooted to allow 
memory to be rewritten to the RAM (Russinovich, Solomon et al. 2012). The second method is to utilise the 
hibernation feature which will copy the contents of RAM to the hard disk and then power down the computer.  
Whilst Firewire may provide greater reliability in copying memory to external storage, and the other methods 
suggested may provide sufficient integrity of the data for Windows Operating Systems, the forensic investigator 
may be in a position where these options are not available. Additionally, these options won’t work if the 
computer has been locked by the user so that access to the RAM is not available. This problem is common and 
whilst asking for the password may be an option, a legally savvy suspect will likely refuse to give the password. 
Furthermore, full disk encryption is becoming more commonplace with freely available software such as 
TrueCrypt that will encrypt all files on a disk rendering them unreadable unless the password is disclosed that 
will decrypt the files. One issue that may also present to investigators during the memory acquisition phase is a 
deliberate attempt to corrupt the contents of memory if a memory dump is attempted. Specialised software 
designed to corrupt the memory can be created and will run when the memory is dumped from the operating 
system (Milkovic 2012). This can be overcome if the anti-forensic can be disabled or the RAM can be removed 
and inserted into another, similar but clean computer.  
In 2016, an experiment was run in freezing RAM using freezing spray (Bauer, Gruhn & Freiling, 2016). In this 
experiment the RAM was cooled insitu with the computer running. The focus on the experiments was to 
demonstrate the recovery of the data and how it could be unscrambled to produce an original image or file. 
Unlike the current experiments, it did not utilise cooling with liquid nitrogen or ice and so has a different focus 
than this research. 
The following section describes the experiments in cooling RAM so that the forensic investigator can remove 
the ram yet maintain the integrity of the data for a sufficient period of time to permit forensic analysis of the 
contents. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The problem for forensic investigators of locked user accounts means that RAM cannot be examined because an 
unlocked computer is required to examine and download RAM. The computer is locked by the user selecting 
‘ctrl alt delete’ which then requires that same user’s password to be entered to unlock the computer. What is 
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therefore required from a forensic investigator is the ability to remove RAM from a locked computer without 
losing the integrity of the digital contents and to either place the RAM into an identical computer or to reboot 
the suspect computer into a state where it is not locked. The RAM can then be inserted into the unlocked 
computer and a memory dump performed. The first stage in the experiments was to boot a laptop computer to 
the Windows 7 operating system. This system was chosen as it remains one of the most common operating 
systems in organisations and for home users. Six actions were then performed to provide data in the 1 GB RAM 
that would be useful in an investigation.  
Those actions were: 
1. Log on to Windows 7 with the administrator username and password. 
2. Open a text file and copied text to the clipboard. 
3. Started an Apache HTTP web server and MySQL database. 
4. Unlocked a TrueCrypt file container and opened several files from the container. 
5. Executed several commands using a DOS prompt. 
6. Launched a web browser and logged into a Facebook account. 
 
The process for calculating the percentage of data recovered was to take an image of the RAM and then to lock 
the account on the computer. The power button was then held down to halt power to the motherboard and the 
RAM removed at the same time where it was immediately put through the cooling process. Once the full 
experiment was completed and a RAM image obtained, this image was then compared to the prior image and 
the percentage of data recovered calculated.  
Whilst this gives an accurate percentage of the data recovered, it does so at a macro level so that if parts of files 
are recovered or even parts of passwords, this is not obvious from the percentages that are recovered. To 
ascertain at a micro level, a more manual examination is required and in the case of recovered passwords this 
was done to ensure that a full password or encryption key has been recovered. The parameters for the test bed 
are shown in table 1: 
Table 1: Testbed Setup 
Item Description 
RAM 1GB DDR3 
Error 
Correction? 
Non Error Correction RAM 
CPU Samsung 2.4GHz  
 
The experiments with freezing RAM to recover its contents began with a baseline to compare the results against. 
The baseline simply involved removing RAM from a computer and inserting the RAM into the now unlocked 
and rebooted computer. The minimum time between removal of the RAM and insertion into the computer was 
10 minutes, allowing ample time for the investigator to reboot the machine to a usable state.  
The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at 35 degrees centigrade. As expected, the contents of RAM 
were deleted upon removal so that no usable forensic evidence could be recovered using this method.  
Table 2 shows the experimental setup for the RAM utilising three different cooling methods. The ambient 
temperature of the RAM before cooling was 35° degrees centigrade. 
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 Table 2: RAM Freezing Experimental Steps 
Method 
Time 
Delay 
Temperature 
Cooled 
degrees C 
Liquid 
Nitrogen 
10mins, 1 
hr, 2hrs 
-196 
Freezing 
Spray 
10 mins -40 
ICE 10 mins 10 
 
The next step was to utilise liquid nitrogen to freeze the RAM. This has been attempted by previous researchers 
with good results. The RAM was removed from the running but locked computer and immediately submerged in 
liquid nitrogen, almost instantly freezing the RAM and it was hoped that the contents would therefore remain. 
The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at -196 degrees centigrade. The experiment was repeated a 
number of times with varying longer delays in removing the RAM from the liquid nitrogen to see of entropy of 
the contents occurred. The experiment was then repeated but with a spray of freezing compressed air rather than 
liquid nitrogen. The freezing by compressed air was a simple process and could easily be performed by a 
forensic investigator in the field as opposed to the practicality of carrying liquid nitrogen to an investigation 
scene. The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at -40 degrees centigrade. Finally, the third stage 
involved removing the RAM, placing it in an anti-static bag and burying it in ice cubes for 10 minutes. The 
surface temperature was measured at 10 degrees centigrade just immediately after removing it from the ice. 
Once cooled, the RAM was then reinserted into the same computer and the computer booted from a USB stick 
with DumpIT, a Linux memory dumping software programme installed on the stick which creates an image of 
the RAM. In the initial boot stages, the software immediately dumped the contents of the RAM onto a storage 
area on the USB stick where it remained for later analysis. The results of the RAM cooling are described below. 
RESULTS 
The purpose of the experiments was to ascertain whether freezing RAM with compressed air or ice would 
provide forensic evidence from the RAM that could be utilised in an investigation. It was ascertained that 
removing RAM and reinserting it 10 minutes later led to almost all contents being deleted. The liquid nitrogen 
provided results that led to almost a complete recovery of the RAM but was not practical for a forensic 
investigation in the field. Therefore, the freezing spray and submergence in ice were of particular interest as 
these methods are both feasible for an investigator. A can of freezing spray is easily obtainable for negligible 
cost and ice may be available if a forensic investigator has no freezing spray readably available. The following 
table shows the results in percentage of data recovered from RAM after 10 minutes. 
 
Table 3: Percentage of forensic data recovered 
Method 
Temperature 
degrees 
Celsius 
Percentage 
Recovered 
No cooling 35 0.2% 
Liquid Nitrogen -196 99.81% 
Freezing Spray -40 96.45% 
Ice 10 99.71% 
The results indicated that whilst liquid nitrogen performed the best, submerging the RAM in ice was a very 
close second best with only 0.1% less data recovered. Freezing spray, whilst the most practical for a forensic 
investigator to carry in their toolkit, results in 96.45% data recovered. Whilst this result is significant, the 3.3% 
data not recovered compared to ice may be vital evidence that would be lost when choosing this method. Next, 
the results for submerging the RAM in liquid nitrogen were extended from previous experiments by allowing 
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for a much greater delay in submerging the RAM and removing it from the liquid nitrogen. The purpose of these 
further experiments were to simulate a forensic investigator who is equipped with a container of liquid nitrogen 
who may be able to simple drop the RAM into the container but may require a sterile and safe environment 
equipped with protective clothing to remove the RAM from the nitrogen.  The time delay was therefore 
extended from 10 minutes to 1 hour and then repeated for a delay of 2.5 hours. The results are shown in table 4.  
 
Table 4: Time delay with liquid nitrogen 
Time delay 
Percentage 
Recovered 
Difference 
10 minutes 99.81%  
1 hour 98.84% -0.97% 
2.5 hours 93.95% -4.89% 
 
It is clear from table 4 that even at -196% Celsius data is lost from RAM if there is a delay in reinserting the 
RAM into an unlocked computer. A delay of 1 hour results in a loss of over 1% more data than by utilising a 
freezing spray. If a delay of 2.5 hours occurs, then the loss exceeds the freezing spray by 2.5%. A delay of 1 
hour may be unrealistic in many scenarios where the submergence of RAM would be followed by seizing of the 
computer and related activities, meaning that returning to a safely equipped laboratory may well take longer 
than 60 minutes. The delay of 2.5 hours is more realistic and shows a significant loss of valuable data. The 
rather low loss of 0.29% of data with ice indicates that this is the preferred method. It shows that loss of data is 
minimal and it is a very safe method, although somewhat cumbersome for the forensic investigator in the field. 
The preferred method may be to carry a can of compressed air as this is simple and fairly safe, but the forensic 
investigator must bear in mind that approximately 3.55% of data will be lost with a delay of only 10 minutes. 
Finally, the data that was recovered from the RAM was identified. A USB drive with Linux software suitable 
for a RAM dump was used to store the RAM image. Among the data recovered was the expected information 
regarding user activities on the computer including web pages visited and processes that were started and 
stopped. Of particular interest was whether the TrueCrypt password could be recovered. It was found in all 
experiments that the 512 bit AES encryption key utilised by TrueCrypt was recovered allowing the encrypted 
files to be decrypted and read. This is particularly important for the forensic investigator because it is often the 
encrypted files that contain the most vital information for the forensic investigator. The recovery of the 
encryption key was possible in all experiments involving cooling of the RAM but with less than 100% of data 
recovered there was some luck involved. Any data that is lost may by bad luck involve the encryption key or 
other vital evidence and so the forensic investigator should bear this in mind when selecting which method to 
utilise. The greater the percentage of data recovered, the greater the likelihood that the most vital data will 
remain in the RAM image. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of a forensic investigation of a computer is to acquire, analyse and potentially use information in a 
criminal, civil or employee investigation. The more information that can be gleaned from the device, the higher 
the likelihood of a successful investigation. Traditional methods of preserving information from a running 
computer usually involve looking at the screen to ascertain running programs and then removing the power to 
the device to preserve the information on the hard disk. Often, the valuable forensic information in RAM is 
overlooked, or thought to be unobtainable because of a locked user account or encrypted files that prevent the 
investigator from reading the files unless the encryption key can be obtained. This is unlikely if the suspect’s 
computer contains malicious or nefarious evidence of wrongdoing. The ability to secure the RAM image is 
therefore highly valuable to the forensic investigator.  
This research provides evidence that RAM images can be obtained in these circumstances, and in the case of 
TrueCrypt encryption, the encryption key may be able to be recovered from the image of memory. This research 
provides a guideline for forensic investigators as to the best methods for a successful data recovery of RAM and 
provides evidence of the importance of time delays in the entropy of information in the case of liquid nitrogen 
freezing. The importance of memory forensics should not be overlooked by the forensic investigator and the 
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implementation of account locking or encryption of files or entire volumes does not present an insurmountable 
challenge to successfully acquiring a RAM image.  
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Abstract 
The use of computer forensics is important for forensic accounting practice because most accounting 
information is in digital forms today. The access to evidence is increasingly more complex and in far greater 
volumes than in previous decades. The effective and efficient means of detecting fraud are required for the 
public to maintain their confidence in the reliability of accounting audit and the reputation of accounting firms. 
The software tools used by forensic accounting can be called into question. Many appear inadequate when faced 
with the complexity of fraud and there needs to be the development of automated and specialist problem-solving 
forensic software. In this paper we review the context of forensic accounting and the potential to develop 
improved support tools. The recommendation is for adopting financial ratio analysis as the basis for an 
improved fraud detection software.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Before a potential fraud can be investigated, it must be detected. The process of fraud detection involves 
searching for symptoms that may indicate that fraud exists (Kovalerchuk et al., 2007, p.2). One of the most 
popular mathematical techniques which are currently used in forensic accounting, is that Benford law. The main 
issue with this technique is that it takes a relatively broad, rather than narrow approach to detecting fraud. As a 
result a lot of false signals can occur with the impact of time consumption and increase costs in investigations. 
Another technique known as relative size factor (RSF), is designed to detect any outliers or unusual data. 
However, any outlier can be just errors in data entry but not financial fraud. Panighahi (2006, p.3) stated that 
“RSF is simple to calculate but not an effective and efficient tool”. An abundance of data creates both challenges 
and opportunities for the forensic accountant. A digital forensics software tool is employed to help deal with the 
big data problem and to speed up both the accuracy and the completion of investigations. The problem with 
computer based fraud detection in the field of forensic accounting is that there are significant differences in task 
performance and knowledge requirements for the completion of investigation. For example, computer forensics 
requires knowledge of computing systems, log files, graphics and other formats, and many other non-accounting 
knowledges. Similarly, data theft prevention and investigation requires database knowledge, computer security 
knowledge, encryption and computer systems (Albright, 2008, p.5). 
In the field of forensic accounting, there are categories of investigation such as: 
 Data mining for fraud Techniques and methodologies for discovering fraud in corporate databases;  
 Financial statement fraud: Ratio analysis and other methods of finding financial statement 
manipulation 
 External information sources: Information about perpetrator finances and other data, usually found in 
websites; and, 
 Computer forensics: Investigating by sifting through computer hard drives and other information 
devices.  
Each context has its own challenges and ways of investigation. As a result, digital forensic software tools have to 
declare capability before use. Otherwise a null or an erroneous result may be obtained from the tool as it is not 
capable in a particular area, and yet fraud exists within the dataset. Therefore, till testing is a critical issue that 
impacts potential evidential outcomes. Verification is required from approved by independent bodies and not just 
proprietary vendor’s (Al Mutawa, et al., 2012, p.26). Researchers in the field suggested that it is vital for 
investigators to compare the suitability of forensic tools in relation to various application environments (Guo & 
Slay, 2010, p.297). Some have common views in analysis of large data (e.g. several terabytes) where tools 
should be able to efficiently and effectively handle the volumes (Yannikos et al., 2011, p.200). Kimmel et al., 
(2012) recommended that an in – depth assessment of the tool based on requirements and an evaluation of 
different packages and their functions within all available types of fraud pattern. What is missing from this 
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advice are statements about how software forensic tools will stay up-to-date and adapt themselves to new 
patterns of fraudulent activity (p.765).  
In this paper we briefly review the problem area of relevancy for current digital forensic and accounting forensic 
software tools. We then propose a focus for the development of accounting forensic tools that takes ratio analysis 
and pattern recognition to be the foundational building block for the analysis. We then propose a fraud detection 
model that is based on the similarity metric for determining the similarity of patterns and the proximity of data to 
events. We conclude by recommending care in the use of current forensics software tools and emphasise the 
necessity of tools being able to not only cope with big data but also complexity. 
THE PROBLEM AREA  
Forensic accounting is the application of accounting knowledge and investigative skills to identify and document 
potential matters with legal implication for fraud and other financial crime (Houck et al., 2006, p.68). Forensic 
accounting is a developing area of specialisation in the field of accounting. Its main concerned with the detection 
and prevention of financial frauds and other forms of economic crime (Dhar and Sarkar, 2010, p.94). In the 
accounting field, there are a number of ongoing activities that, collectively, allow business owners or managers 
to access the information when they need it in order to make well informed decisions. In terms of business 
operation, this includes basic transactions such as purchases and sales, and marketing and strategic planning as 
well as summative information. Accounting refers to financial record keeping and data reporting that businesses 
engage in to meet legal requirements and keep the organisation’s stakeholders informed of the organization's 
financial position at any point of the year. Accounting is defined as a systematic process of identifying, 
recording, measuring, classifying, verifying, summarizing, interpreting and communicating financial 
information. It reveals profit or loss for a given period, and the value and nature of a firm's assets, liabilities and 
owners' equity (Business Dictionary, 2016, p.1). However, the financial statement will only be as good as the 
journal entries (Haber, 2004, p.7). Missing or fraudulent journal entries will produce financial statement that is 
fraudulent (Basuhail, 2010, p.97). 
Financial statements are prepared to present fair information about the financial position, operating performance 
of the organisation or the business. The international standards on auditing 240 stated that, fraud and error must 
be considered when auditing financial statements (Smith et al., 2008, p.18). Furthermore, the auditor must 
perform procedures to assist the entity in the detection of fraud (Council, 2013, p.13).  As a result of the Enron 
and WorldCom failures (Reinstein and McMillan, 2004, p.956), the accounting arena had undergone 
fundamental changes to redress the shortcomings found in previous audit requirements. Therefore, a new market 
with a new class of accountants known as forensic accountants has emerged. The white collar crimes is in focus 
and occupational fraud. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) estimates that occupational fraud 
losses cost organizations $994 billion annually (Davis et al., 2010, p.5; Crumbley et al., 2005, p.400). Forensic 
accounting and fraud examination are different but related. Forensic accounting work is done by accountants in 
anticipation of litigation and can include fraud, valuation, bankruptcy and a host of other professional services. 
Fraud examinations can be conducted by either accountants or non-accountants and refer only to anti-fraud 
matters (Wells, 2003, p.76). 
DIGITAL FORENSIC SOFTWARE TOOLS 
The amount of data stored in accounting files requires digital management. This means that relevant and 
appropriate software must be available to process the data and to extract the relevant information. Forensic 
investigation and the analysis of accounting data for fraudulent patterns has become more and more complex 
(Albano, et al., 2011, p.381). Digital forensics integrates the fields of computer science and law to investigate 
crime (Dezfouli, et al., 2012, p.186). For any digital evidence to be used in court, investigators must follow a 
proper set of procedures when collecting and analysing data from computer systems (Jansen & Ayers, 2007, 
p.6). Hence the interface between the investigator and the data is mediated by software but due to the differences 
in terms of the technologies, investigators will have to engage different methods and tools depending on the 
category of information involved (Albano, et al., 2011, p.381). Therefore, prior to acquiring data from a 
comprised device, extra cautions must be taken, standard procedures and base practises must be followed 
carefully. This is to avoid altering data in the process because digital data can be easily corrupted (Jansen & 
Ayers, 2007, p.45). The first challenge for forensic software tools is the bridging of the structures, protocols, and 
designs in which the data resides. The second challenge is then to be able to identify accurately patterns of 
conformance, compliance, and aberrations that may occur within the data (Ayers, 2007, p.1).  Each tool has a 
different core set of features that are designed to deliver specific outcomes (NIST, 2013, p.4). Reliable digital 
forensic techniques are therefore important for prevention, detection, and investigation of electronic crime 
(Nissan, 2012, p.843). For example, in table 1 and analysis has been completed of different accounting forensic 
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and digital forensic tools that may be employed in an investigation. The analysis shows that each tool has a 
different capability and that some do overlap. However, an investigator has to be fully aware of these limitations 
before a tool is selected or used for forensic accounting purposes (Mohtasebi & Dehghantanha, 2013, 353).  For 
most the integrity of the evidences and its admissibility in the court of law has to be preserved. As a result, it is 
critical for an investigator to know the reliability and accuracy of the tool (Kubi et al., 2011, p.2) and to select 
one’s that are to be effective and efficient in the particular situation.      
  
Table 1. Experiment results  (Grispos, et al., 2011, p.30). 
 
Keys that the authors used in Table 3.2 are F = Full, P = Partial, D = Detected and N = Not. 
In spite of everything, all logical data can be acquired and analysed yet, tool developers seem to over claim their 
tool’s support while the tool can only obtain some of the requirements. As a result, forensic tools should be 
evaluated based on their abilities and not the costs. For example, a tool may have better support for a particular 
brand of operating system or device (Morrissey, 2010, p.130). Many of the current software tools for forensic 
investigation may not be used in financial related investigation beyond the extraction of data because they do not 
discriminate sufficiently at the higher complexity levels. A forensic accountant requires detection of fraud in 
financial statement reports which is more than just extracting the report data. As a result, the abstraction of 
models is required to detect fraud in a financial report.  
ACCOUNTING RATIOS 
The initial design of the proposed model was developed based on the learning from the analysis of the literature, 
formulated to fill the gap, and avoid repetition. The reading and analysis gain sufficient abstraction that the 
modelling system would rest above the data level. The result is a tentative detection model for financial fraud 
that requires testing and validation. The initial design of the financial fraud detection model comprises of five 
financial ratios - Return on Assets (ROA), Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio, Current Ratio, Total Asset 
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Turnover and Inventory Turnover. The implication is that for a financial report - which brings together many 
segregated areas – financial ratios from each of the implicated areas are required comparison against the industry 
standard or a benchmark from the trend analysis ratios (Albano, et al., 2011). Models are an abstraction of a 
process to examine potential evidence, irrespective of the originality of the evidence (Peisert, et al., 2008, p.116). 
Forensic experts also believe that forensic investigation process models generalise an informal procedure to 
deliver a framework. That framework provides a detailed understanding of what each process is to do and not do. 
Jankun-Kelly, et al. (2007) explained that the model and framework provides an effective means to acquire 
information within the process. These processes are used to capture relevant aspects of the investigation (p.357). 
A breakdown of each ratio for building into the tool is as follows: 
Return on Assets (ROA), Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio, Current Ratio, Total Asset Turnover 
and Inventory Turnover: If an organisation or business is subject to an audit, the auditors will review its 
accounts receivable in some detail. Accounts receivable is frequently the largest asset that a company has, so 
auditors tend to spend a considerable amount of time gaining assurance that the amount of the stated asset is 
reasonable  
Return on Assets:  
A measure of the return on total investment; It is sometimes desirable to add interest to after tax profits to form 
the numerator of the ratio since total assets are financed by creditors as well as by stockholders; hence, it is 
accurate to measure the productivity of assets by the returns provided to both classes of investors. 
Current ratio:  
Indicates the extent to which the claims of short-term creditors are covered by assets that are expected to be 
converted to cash in a period roughly corresponding to the maturity of the liabilities. 
Total assets turnover:  
 
A measure of the utilization of all the firm's assets; a ratio below the industry average indicates the company is 
not generating a sufficient volume of business, given the size of its asset investment.                                                                        
Inventory turnover:   
 
When compared to industry averages, it provides an indication of whether a company has excessive or perhaps 
inadequate finished goods inventory. 
Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio: Shows the relationship between unpaid sales and the total sales 
revenue. It is considered high if it is near to 1.0, because that means a significant amount of cash is tied up with 
the slow paying customers. Formula: Total accounts receivable (outstanding in an accounting period) ÷ sales 
revenue (in the same period).  
Accounts Receivable (A/R) turnover = Average credit sale/Accounts Receivable: Ratio that shows the 
relationship between unpaid credit sales to total credit sales. It indicates, in general, the effectiveness (or lack of 
it) of a firm's credit policies and cash collection efforts. Formula: Outstanding accounts receivable (in an 
accounting period) ÷ credit sales revenue (in the same period), also called receivable turnover. 
FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS 
Financial analysis techniques can help investigators discover and examine unexpected relationships in financial 
information (Davis, et al., 2010). These analytical procedures are based on the premise that relatively stable 
relationships exist among economic events in the absence of conditions to the contrary. Known contrary 
conditions which cause unstable relationships to exist might include unusual or nonrecurring transactions or 
events, and accounting, environmental, or technological changes. Public companies experiencing these events 
must disclose and explain the facts in their financial statements. Increasingly, private and not-for-profit 
companies follow best practices and do the same. Financial ratios are a great way to analyse a company’s 
strengths and weaknesses. Ratios convert financial information to standardised format that can be used to 
compare with other companies and industry expectations. Unexpected deviations in relationships most likely 
indicate errors, but also might indicate illegal acts or fraud (Kovalerchuk et al., 2007). Therefore, deviations in 
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expected relationships warrant further investigation to determine the exact cause. Several methods of analysis 
assist the reader of financial reports in highlighting the areas that most likely represent fraudulent accounting 
methods (Dhar et al., 2010). An understanding of general relationships between certain financial statement 
balances is necessary to identify relationships that appear unusual. If sales increase, how should the cost of sales 
respond? If commission expense decreases, what would be expected of sales? Answers to questions such as 
these are the foundation of financial analysis. The following relationships are general, and traditionally occur 
between financial accounts; however, unique circumstances may render different results. The following is a 
worked example: 
For the current year, ABC Ltd reported the following ratios: 
-ROA = 20% 
- Asset Turnover (being Sales/Average Total Assets) = 2.5 times 
- Net Profit Margin = 15% 
QUESTION: Why would we suspect at least one of these ratios is not correct? 
We must be able to identify a relationship between the given ratios: 
ROA = Net Income/Average Total Assets 
ASSET TURNOVER = Sales/Average Total Assets 
NET PROFIT MARGIN = Net Income/ Sales 
Now, we can look at the common factors: 
ROA and ASSET TURNOVER both use Average Total Assets 
ROA and NET PROFIT MARGIN both use Net Income 
ASSET TURNOVER and NET PROFIT MARGIN both use Sales 
Now, we can look at the values provided: 
ROA = 0.20 ASSET TURNOVER = 2.5 NPM = 0.15 
We can then prove these values are not consistent. This can be done either by using algebra, or by simply assuming a 
value for one of the common factors. In this case, let’s assume average total assets equal $100 (although any value 
can be chosen to prove if the ratios are consistent). 
If that is the case; Net income/100 = 0.20  (so Net Income = 20) 
   Sale / 100 = 2.50   (so Sales = 250) 
 Then:  Net Income / Sales would have to be: 20 / 250 =0.08 
Conclusion: NPM of 15% is not consistent with the values of ROA = 20% and 
Asset Turnover = 2.5 times. 
These ratios may also reveal frauds other than accounting frauds. If an employee is embezzling from the 
company’s accounts, for instance, the amount of cash will decrease disproportionately and the current ratio will 
decline. Liability concealment will cause a more favourable ratio. Similarly, a cheque-tampering scheme will 
usually result in a decrease in current assets, namely cash, which will, in turn, decrease the current ratio. In fact, 
these frauds may be more easily detected with ratio analysis because employees other than management would 
not have access to accounting cover-ups of non-accounting frauds. Anomalies in ratios could point directly to the 
existence of fraudulent actions. Accounting frauds can be much more subtle and demand extensive investigation 
beyond the signal that something is out of the norm.  
THE PROPOSED FRAUD DETECTION MODEL 
The Euclidean Distance based similarity metric is to evaluate the similarity of the standard industry ratios 
(Return on Assets (ROA), Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio, Current Ratio, Total Asset Turnover and 
Inventory Turnover) against the ratios of the current financial statement in order to determine if a fraud has 
occurred. Bajcsy and Kovačič (1989) argued that defining the problem will be the best way to understand the 
nature of the problem in its entirety. To evaluate the similarity between two different objects, x and y, a distance 
metric known as Euclidean Distance (EU) is used, this defines as follows:    (1) 
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This metric can be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2, …, yn}. In this 
case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as:  
           =                (2)      
Let L1 and L2 be the existing standard industry ratios and the current financial statement ratios, respectively. Let 
xi represent each ratio from the standard industry ratios and yi represent each ratios from the financial statement, 
where i={1, 2, …, n} and n is the total number of ratios. In this case, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}. 
Euclidean distance can be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow:            (3) 
          
Similarity normalized EU into a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects are 
identical and a value of 0 means that the two objects are not identical. This study focuses on detecting financial 
fraud and identifying the means of the fraud. In order to detect the fraud, the similarity between the industry 
standard ratios and the ratios of the current financial report is ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance 
between L1 and L2 is calculated first by using equation (1) and then the similarity can be ranked based on 
equation (3).  
For example: 
Using equation 1, if the industry standard for Return on assets: profit after tax/total assets = 1.5 and in the 
current financial report its 2.5 therefore it is calculated as follows: 
    
   =  
   = 1 
In order to normalise this into a value in between 0 to 1, use the similarity metric as showed in equation 3 
       = 0.5 
The result is interpreted from predefined tabulated charts or user constructed tables based on empirical sample 
data constructed from use cases. The default setting is a result that falls between 0.5 and 1; and it indicates 
acceptance, but if it falls below 0.5 then it signals a red flag. A red flag means that the data requires further 
investigation. The metric acts as an indicator that eliminates possibilities rather than a deterministic measure that 
nominates an outcome. It cannot be used in isolation from expert knowledge and practitioner experience but in 
large datasets it can heighten the awareness of variations that are most likely indicate errors, and illegal acts or 
fraud. Therefore, deviations in expected relationships warrant further investigation to determine the exact cause.  
CONCLUSION 
Current digital forensics tools when applied to forensic accounting came up inadequate in our testing because 
they lack models that can sufficiently abstract from the data concerned. In this paper, the distance based 
similarity metric was proposed as the method for detection and identification of fraud, and a solution to the 
complexity problem. The result from the simple case developed to validate the method showed that the distance 
based similarity metric can detect financial statement variations that are an advancement on the simple ratio 
model tests and these variations can be mapped onto patterns of different activities, including fraud.  It is also 
evident in this study that the metric effectively improved the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of the 
examination and analysis of large datasets of financial statements. This is helpful given the big data issues 
surrounding accounting and audit practice. For future work, a use case database of reference tables is to be 
developed from the application of this tool in industry so that the normalisation measure may be better matched 
onto scenario and context based situations. In its current form the metric is an improvement on the current ratio 
detection systems and has potential for coding into other digital forensic tools or into its own accounting forensic 
tool.  
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Abstract 
The easy access and common usage of GNSS systems has provided a wealth of evidential information that may 
be accessed by a digital forensic investigator. Google Earth is commonly used on all manner of devices for 
geolocation services and consequently has a wide range of tools that will relate real time and stored GNSS data 
to maps. As an aid to investigation Google Earth forensics is available for use. An investigator can use it by 
downloading geolocation data from devices and placing it on Google Earth maps, place geolocation data on 
historical archival maps, or by direct usage of the application in a device. In this paper we review the Google 
Earth forensics tool and use a simplistic scenario to demonstrate the power of the application for courtroom 
walk-throughs. The entry-level tool is free and can be used effectively to enhance the presentation of geolocation 
data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advancements   in   technology   over   the   last   20   years   have drastically   altered   the   way   people   live   
and   do   business (Garfinkel, et al., 2009, p.3). The advancements have driven the growth of popularity and 
usages of mobile devices such as Smartphones and all the related application packages. This growth is expected 
to continue for the foreseeable future and the mobile devices market to expand (Liu, et al., 2012, p.145). The 
increasing storage capacity and functionality of these mobile devices have outnumbered personal computers and 
become the personal device of choice in our society. Large amounts of information from phone book to photo 
albums and videos, to emails and text messages, to financial records and GNSS (Global Satellite Positioning 
System) records, are stored in these phones (Mylonas, et al., 2012, p.249). Mobile devices have the ability to 
network especially via wireless connections such as Wi-Fi, cellular network such as 3G and 4G (Liu, et al., 
2012). Mobile devices are relatively small, portable and widely used by all ages, and especially by young people. 
Mobile devices consist of Smartphones, Tablets, embedded devices, Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), and a 
range of evolving products (Bennett, 2012, p.159). The personalisation and control handed to the user make 
these anytime, anywhere devices the communication device of choice. The end user finds the usefulness, 
capability, numerous applications, high processing power and improved communication performance, to be in 
line with their demand for experience (Yusoff, et al., 2014, p.141). 
Mobile phone forensics is defined by the National Institutes of Standards and Technology as, the science of 
recovering digital evidence from a mobile phone under forensically sound conditions using accepted methods 
(Jansen & Ayers, 2007, p.6). The new generation of digital mobile devices are known as Smart devices because 
of their processing power, memory and storage spaces that are very similar to that of a desktop computer. 
However, the operating system that runs on these Smart devices has its own file system and structure. On Smart 
devices, the operating system functions come from volatile memory whereas with computers it is in RAM and 
ROM. These Smart devices are capable of storing, transmitting and processing large amounts of private and 
confidential data (Owen & Thomas, 2011, p.25). Yet, the main challenge to forensic experts is the fact that 
Smart devices are different proprietary designs, software, and access controls. As a result, forensic experts must 
stay up-to-date with the latest technology in order to be able to adapt to technological changes and strategize new 
approaches (Rajendran and Gopalan, 2016, p.394). 
The affordability of these  devices,  the  proliferation  of  wireless  hotspots  and  the  availability  of  wireless 
location services have created new business opportunities and demand for use (Karygiannis and Antonakakis, 
2009, p.308). This has led the researchers in the field to find a way of providing location based services to 
mobile clients.     
This paper is structured to review previous literature on geolocation services, to review Google Earth forensic 
capability, and then to provide a test scenario and walk-through. The results are then discussed to elicit the 
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implications for practice. The conclusion is that Google Earth is a powerful tool to visualise location data in 
context. However, it is important to practice with the tool and then to use forensic examination procedures to 
collect and to manage the evidence. This ensures the best opportunity that the findings can be admissible in the 
court of law. 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Recently, the mobile sensing data are used for analysing users’ activities such as, their emotions, health 
conditions, their usage patterns and social relationships. This is done in order to study and understand human’s 
behaviour (Mo, et al., 2015, p.391). These studies were triggered by the widespread use of highly capable and 
multifunctional Smart devices, collecting and analysing mobile sensing data are given more attention in recent 
years. These days, Smartphones are very much part of people’s everyday lives and including recreation. User’s 
takes these Smart devices along everywhere they go. These Smart devices such as Smartphones consist of 
various sensors and technologies. As a result, they collect a variety of information such as the user’s locations, 
activities, phone calls, SMS, e-mails, call logs, contact list, applications, and so on. Recently, various smart 
application services have been developed using GNSS, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) and sensor 
network connectivity. 
The GNSS has been successfully applied for outdoor location tracking by many applications, but it might still be 
insufficient in an indoor environment where GNSS signals are often severely obstructed. 
Location Based Services 
Researchers in the field have been working on the possibility of providing location based services (LBSs) to 
mobile clients. Researchers believed that such technology can be very helpful if available indoors in places like 
shopping malls, train stations, airports and universities for sharing information, schedule change of train and 
flight, and so on (Sadhukhan, et al., 2010, p.10). As a result, the indoor location tracking systems has shown its 
importance for personal information use. GNSS is the well-known and commonly used technology for providing 
location information services. Location Based Services (LBS) on the other hand, has limitations of dependency 
on satellite visibility and problems with accuracy and consistency of service in cities, covered areas and multi-
path contexts (Kim, et al., 2014, p.89). Mobile RFID applications has been utilised to play a role in the 
implementation of an indoor tracking system for exhibition service (Kim et al., 2014, p.96). RFID-Based 
Navigation System is utilised to reduce localization errors (Reza and Buehrer, 2012, p.1023). However, the 
intensity of experience that satisfies end user geolocation requirements is driving use of positioning technology 
for security applications, quality control in manufacturing, and safety applications in high-risk areas (Werner, 
2014a, p.74).  
Location-based services are built by detecting the environments of a mobile device. The inherent complexities of 
buildings and the localization problem inside buildings that make most indoor location based services use a large 
amount of environmental information from various sources (Werner, 2014b, p.169). Nonetheless, it’s always 
being sufficient to detect the location of the user with regards to the planned route. The navigational events 
consist of directional changes yet, inside buildings, the people are missing the navigational experience (Werner, 
2014b, p.169). 
Mobile Sensing 
In order to understand human’s behaviours, mobile sensing data is collected and analysed to show activities, 
usage patterns, emotions, health conditions and social relationships (Mo, et al., 2015, p.391). The customer 
location tracking system is also used to send location specific information advertisements to users via their 
mobile Smart device (Keikhosrokiani, et al., 2011, p.527). A mobile smart device such as Smartphones has the 
characteristics of personalization. As a result, they are utilised to develop a platform for home care for the 
elderly combining with alarm clock. This allows the device to remind the patients to take their medicine (Cheng, 
et al., 2011, p.259). Sensor-equipped mobile device revolutionised sectors of our economy including business, 
healthcare, social networks, environmental monitoring, and transportation (Lane et al., 2010, p.140). Also Ultra-
High Frequency (UHF) RFID technology has been applied to supply chain, asset tracking, antifraud system and 
intelligent transportation systems and so on (Eo, et al., 2008, p.730). RFID technology on Smart devices 
incorporates the RFID technology with the cellular network. This allows access to information stored on the tag 
through the RFID reader on the Smart device such as Smartphone (Peng, et al., 2012, p.243). RFID technologies 
have been utilised in retail to track inventory, in manufacturing to track product status, and also in airlines to 
track lost baggage (Wang, et al., 2009, p.495). However, researchers in the field have identified two primary 
types of GNSS location traces - location-only and location-based. Location uses the reference data for visual 
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inspection to infer trip purposes (Wolf et al., 2003, p.6). Location-based studies on the other hand, incorporate 
other supplementary data such as related trip information (Schönfelder et al., 2003, p.8; Stopher et al., 2008, 
p.2).  
Location Value 
Location plays a key role in defining the nature of human activities. Location can determine users’ requirements, 
buying behaviours and service choices (Rao and Minakakis, 2003, p.63). If the provider knows the user’s exact 
location and has the ability to target valuable information, the benefits can be reciprocated. However, awareness 
of the user’s location is only part of the problem (Schönfelder, et al., 2003, p.1). The Human trajectories3 
application has sets of time-stamped locations describing individuals’ movements in time (typically over a day), 
and are potentially of great use for many different interested parties. On their own, they reveal the fundamentals 
of human mobility patterns (Gonzalez et al., 2008, p.780). Therefore, human-carried mobile devices, routing and 
broadcasting algorithms deployed in various cellular networks should take advantage of the properties of human 
mobility in order to be effective (Marin et al., 2014, p.204). Thus, based on the where, how, why, when, and who 
with, users’ are routing. Someone can be in a rugby game with friends most likely to have different LBS profile 
from that of a person on a routine trip to the supermarket or shopping mall. If the provider has the ability to 
deliver reliable information to users, they might have difficulty identifying what the user is doing or looking for 
at that location (Heinemann and Gaiser, 2015, p.55). All of these matters can become evidential and in this day 
and age they are stored digitally. 
Significant developments and advances in the field of wireless communication technologies, location sensors 
and global networking, are driving a new world (Saha and Mukherjee, 2003, p.25). The Smartphone generation 
is accustomed to the connected world; it becomes a custom to be connected to any person, anytime, anywhere. In 
fact, people want to be able to monitor and control everything in their lives at anytime from anywhere 
(Siewiorek, 2012, p.323). However, in the inter-connected world, people prefer not to only limit to Smart 
devices only. The Internet is being extended to connect every device around us, and is generally known as the 
Internet of Things (IoT) and the Internet of Everything (IoE). IoT is a concept of a dynamic that is constantly 
building up and escalating into a future technology full immersion experience (Jun, et al., 2011, p.3). According 
to Kantarci and Mouftah (2015), IoT interconnects billions of objects that are uniquely identifiable and that have 
communications, computing and sensing functionalities (p.1865). In such an environment, the acquired data 
mainly used to analyse human’s behaviour, looking for patterns that can be useful in location based service 
(Vlassenroot, et al., 2015, p.19). However, in some cases even if the data is stored offline, the size of the data is 
so large and distributed; it will require the use of big data analytical tools for processing (Aggarwal et al., 2013, 
p.383). Big data comes from various sources, in this case, the location based service sensor, the mobile device 
GNSS signals, sensors used to gather climate information, social networking sites data, digital photos and 
videos, and so on. These data is known as Big Data, and analysing such data sets strengthens new streams of 
productivity growth, innovation, and consumer surplus. Learning gained from the result of analysing Big Data 
can help to answer human technology immersion and proximity questions (Ciobanu, et al., 2014, p.4). In 
addition all of this data and information can become evidential and useful to forensic investigation. 
GOOGLE EARTH REVIEW 
Google Earth Forensics is a practical and easily accessible tool kit for using with Google Earth Geo-Location 
services. Google Earth (GE) is a tool that enables its users to view the planet through a virtual globe. Users can 
navigate through satellite images, aerial photography, and even views of street level imagery and 3D models of 
the world. This includes locations like oceans, the moon, Mars, and outer space. Features in GE allows tours of 
locations, historical archive mapping, and to fly across locations using a flight simulator (Harrington and Cross, 
2015, p.1). GE provides a representation to real locations within the material limitations of the data collected and 
the visual presentation. When a location is entered into GE, a map will display and it will include the labelled 
position of the place you are searching for. It will also allow zooming to see 3D structures or actual photos of a 
location. GE also allows the viewing of areas of the earth using custom maps or overlays which contain data 
imported from GNSS units and other digital devices. It is an information source and geolocation search 
application for multiple usages (Parks, 2009, p.537). 
GE is known to be utilised by Police throughout the world in various ways to investigate crimes and share 
information with the general public. Analysts in law enforcement agencies gather data from police reports and 
other sources and made it available through GE. For instance, the Shawnee Police Department in Kansas 
provides data that can be loaded into GE to see locations where robberies, auto thefts, vandalism and other 
crimes have taken place (Shawnee PD, 2010, p.1). In the digital forensics domain, knowing where a computer or 
device has been is very important in an investigation. However, we are living in an age where mobility is highly 
vital. As a result, knowing the exact location of a device when involved in a certain activity is vital information 
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to a forensic investigator (Google Earth Forensics, 2015, p.1). It is possible to chart user’s movements from data 
found on Smartphones from metadata of a photo and other media. The data by itself, however, may not mean 
much. It needs to be translated into a meaningful form. Perkins and Dodge (2009) argued that, secrets are 
strongly associated with visual culture, where they are hidden from view but may be revealed. They are 
ubiquitous, but often unseen and are particularly associated with certain spaces. Google Earth Forensics (2015) 
note that, many devices store location data as a matter of course – even, sometimes, when the user has asked it 
not to (p.546). 
Forensics is the use of scientific or technological techniques to investigate and establish facts. In a criminal case, 
the facts you are looking for will be evidence of how a crime was committed and who was responsible 
(Harrington and Cross, 2015, p.4). Throughout a process of preserving the crime scene and identifying, 
gathering and examining evidence, information is carefully documented. This is used in the hopes of 
understanding what occurred, and so that it may be used to identify, arrest and convict the perpetrator (Takeuchi, 
et al., 2012, p.183). GE can be used to search and display location-specific information in a way that is more 
telling than the raw data. Using GE as a forensic tool, you can also: 
 Import data from mobile devices and GNSS units to determine a route that was taken, or locations that a 
person visited 
 Determine the location where a photo was taken using geo-location information stored in a digital picture 
 Create maps that display locations that a device visited, and movies that covey location-based information in 
a compelling format for investigations and court presentation 
The following screenshots illustrate the use of Google forensics for the processing of data taken from a mobile 
device. XRY (figure 1) is used as the extraction tool and then the data is imported into Google forensics to 
demonstrate its usefulness. The screen shot show a step-by-step process guide for the use of the tool and 
instruction for others who wish to use it. 
Harrington and Cross (2015) stated that, GE can be incorporated into various phases of the digital forensic 
procedure. Most often, users may surprise to know that it is used in later parts of a case, when coordinates from 
various sources needs to be analysed or a tool to create presentations relating to geographic locations. In some 
cases, it may also be used to acquire GNSS data from a device, although other tools may be more suited to 
collecting such data for a forensic investigation (p.73).  
In this example, the XRY was used to acquire data from an iPhone 6 plus 64GB running on iOS 10.0.2. Figure 1 
showed XRY logical was used to acquire the data from the iPhone 6 Plus. The XRY Reader v6.18 - 32bit as 
showing in figure 2 is used to read and analyse the data. The forensic process was done on HP laptop running on 
i7 processor with 8GB of RAM. Operating system is Microsoft Windows 10 Professional. 
 
Figure 1: Preliminary view provided by XRY 
The XRY Reader in figure 1 showed detailed information on the location data found and selected in the data 
acquired. This information includes longitude, latitude, altitude, and also date, time, and a preview of the 
location in google map. This location data can also be exported in various formats such as pdf, word, excel, 
GPX, XML, HTML or GE.   
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 Figure 2: Exporting location data into Google Earth format 
In this study, the location data was exported into GE format as shows in figure 2 and then opened with GE. For 
this study, GE 7.1.7.2600 was used.   
Figure 3 shows the result when the exported file is opened in GE. This shows a much clearer view of the 
location showed in figure 2. GE itself is not a recognized or standardized forensic tool but has the functionality 
to display geolocation data. All of the issues with accuracy and timeliness require declaration and any variations 
reported. Figure 4 has the Google forensics import GNSS data panel. 
 
 
Figure 3: Google Earth view 
 
Figure 4: Google Earth GNSS import panel 
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Compliance is important because any matter may be cross-examined or challenged in court. For instance, instead 
of simply plugging the GNSS device directly into a USB port, it is highly recommended to make sure that a 
software write protection or a hardware write blocker is used to prevent any accidental modification of data. 
Acquiring the GNSS location data in this manner, it shows the number of waypoints, tracks and routes that are 
imported from a GNSS device. However, importing GNSS data in this way has disadvantages because it copies 
the data directly off the device into GE. It only performs a logical acquisition and does not retrieve any deleted 
or even hidden data on the device.       
 
To import the data direct in to GE, perform the following steps. 
1) In GE, click on the Tools menu, and then click the GNSS menu item 
2) When the GNSS Import dialog box appears select the type of device you are importing from. As our 
scenario involves a Garmin GNSS unit, we would click the Garmin option to import from that device 
3) In the Import section, select what you want to import: n Waypoints – these are individual locations marked 
on the GNSS unit. n Tracks – these are where the GNSS has been. n Routes – these are a series of locations 
where the user wishes to navigate. 
4) In the Output section, select the output to be used with GE. 
 
When ready to start obtaining data, clicking the Import button, GE will import the data from the device. A 
summary of the imported data will be displayed on the screen once finished. 
APPLICATION OF GOOGLE EARTH FORENSICS 
In the previous section a step-by-step guide has been provided on how to use GE with Google forensics. In this 
section, a simple scenario is adopted to demonstrate how generated data can be displayed as a courtroom walk-
through.   
“Alleged young children kidnapping and trafficking”     
A deal gone wrong and from the crime scene, a mobile Smart device was found and suspected of being involved 
in some criminal activities. As a result, the Smart phone was taken back to the lab for processing. Upon 
examination of the Smart phone, there were several geotagged photographs which led the investigator to look at 
the geolocation data on the device. 
In this case, the geolocation file has been acquired from the device, and the location data can be imported into 
GE. In GE, the placemarks can also be modified. This is a commonly used feature and very important for 
pinpointing locations and presenting information regarding a crime scene in this case or even other places related 
to a case. To add a placemark in GE, click on the Add Placemark button on the toolbar. 
 
Figure 5: Customising placemark dialog 
Fill out the upper portion of the dialog with the information shown in Figure 5 and click OK when done. Once 
the location file from the Smart device is loaded into GE, it displays the waypoints as shown in figure 6. 
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 Figure 6: Waypoints 
In relation to the case scenario, the illustration in figure 6 showed the places in the public park where the events 
are located. Zooming in to get a ground level view, allows a representation of the crime scene in three-
dimensional space. The images can be overlaid with evidence as it has been collected and GNSS located. 
Placemarks in GE can be customised according to the nature of the case depending whether it is a phone, a 
vehicle or other matter at the crime scene. It is not only the placemarks but also content may be added to 
describe area around the placemark to link it to reports and photographs and narratives. In this way three-
dimensional and historical image mapping may be used to reconstruct a crime scene and presented in visual 
format in a courtroom. 
CONCLUSION 
Access to Google forensics is extremely helpful to all forensic investigators. The entry-level packages is free and 
provides considerable capability to process and demonstrate geolocation data. Geolocation and psycho location 
data are readily available from Smart devices in this day and age and provide a whole multidimensional image of 
human behaviour. In this paper we have provided a step-by-step guide as to how to use the tool and to apply it to 
a courtroom walk-through. We have also cautioned that acceptable forensic practices must also be used for the 
data acquisition and management processes. Further research and demonstration of historical archiving Google 
forensics capability can also be helpful in cold cases. 
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Abstract  
A Faraday bag is designed to shield a mobile phone or small digital device from radio waves entering the bag 
and reaching the device, or to stop radio waves escaping through the bag from the device. The effectiveness of 
these shields is vital for security professionals and forensic investigators who seize devices and wish to ensure 
that their contents are not read, modified or deleted prior to a forensic examination. This research tests the 
effectiveness of several readily available Faraday bags. The Faraday bags tested are all available through 
online means and promise complete blocking of all signals through the bag. Additionally, other materials that 
can be used if a Faraday bag is not available, such as tin foil and a tin can are tested and compared with the 
Faraday bags. A selection of common mobile phones from various manufacturers is tested in the shielding 
material. Additionally, 3G / 4G, WiFi and Bluetooth are tested with the bags and materials on those so 
equipped devices to ascertain whether the material blocks all signals from communicating technologies on the 
phones. Results show that performance of the bags is not as promised by most vendors and that in urgent 
situations other materials at hand may suffice to perform the same function as a Faraday bag.  
 
Keywords  
privacy, security, shielding, mobile, forensics, Faraday bags 
INTRODUCTION  
The utilisation of smart mobile devices plays a key role in the majority of day-to-day lives, where most carry at 
least one electronic device, whether they be for corporate use as a portable office, or personal use for tasks such 
as social networking and entertainment (Rajendran & Gopalan, 2016). This reliance on smartphones is credited 
to their proven advantages regarding efficiency in fulfilling both personal needs and business development, 
supported by the influx of availability and variety of mobile devices and their compatible applications (Khan, 
Abbas, & Al-Muhtadi, 2015). Current mobile devices, specifically the smartphone, combine telephony and 
computer services in a convenient handheld device. Standard telephone services are provided through a cellular 
network, while Internet services are utilised through a Wi-Fi connection or via 3G and 4G cellular data networks 
(Soukup, 2015). Google’s Android, and Apple’s iOS are the two main platforms which dominate today’s mobile 
market (FireEye, 2015), with the everyday use of smart devices steadily increasing, while the utilisation and 
cost of basic feature phones and personal computers continually fall (Ophoff & Robinson, 2014). Where older 
models of mobile phones could only store a limited amount of data, which was easily obtainable by forensic 
investigators, the increased popularity and development of smart devices has complicated the techniques which 
must be employed by forensic investigators in order to retrieve the many variants of stored data in a forensically 
sound manner (Bennett, 2012). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A mobile device must have at least one wireless network interface to allow for data communications, whether it 
be Wi-Fi, cellular networking or additional technologies which can be used for connecting a device to networks 
or the Internet, as well as providing built-in data storage. In order to be considered a mobile device, the device 
must host an operating system which is not considered a complete operating system such as found on a desktop 
or laptop and have compatible applications which are available through multiple means. The smartphone has 
been described by Androulidakis (2016) as one of the most characteristic digital devices of current times, with 
its pervasion into everyday life and worldwide distribution.  
Over time, an abundance of data is collected and stored on a smartphone based on its use, which is strongly 
correlated to the device’s owner or primary user. This stored data has become increasingly sought after and may 
be involved in court trials to support the solving of crimes with evidence which can be retrieved from the 
device. Some types of evidence which can be extracted from a mobile phone as identified by Androulidakis 
(2016), include; device location, which can be based on the serving base location or GPS data; association of 
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contacts, based on call logs which detail incoming and outgoing calls to and from the device; and 
communication content such as messages and emails which may have been sent, received or stored on the 
handset. Digital Evidence has been defined by the National Institute of Justice (2016) as information which is 
stored or transmitted in binary form which can be relied on in court. Digital evidence has grown from being 
primarily associated with electronic crime to now being utilised to support the prosecution of all crimes due to 
the nature of information which individuals store on their personal devices it may be possible to derive critical 
evidence regarding criminal intent, whereabouts in relation to a crime, or relationships to other suspects or 
involved parties.  
As identified by Rajendran and Gopalan (2016) in their mobile forensics investigation lifecycle process, once a 
digital device has been acquired, and information regarding the devices specifications and its surroundings upon 
acquisition have been gathered, the immediate action which needs to be taken is disabling the device from not 
only the mobile network and the Internet, but also disabling Bluetooth, tethering, and any other kind of external 
connections. Androulidakis (2016) states that the main principle of digital forensics is the preservation of data. 
This supports the idea of data preservation and network isolation as a compulsory measure to ensure that data 
cannot be altered in order to stand up in court. In the case that digital evidence has been altered, which can occur 
due to data which can change or destroy the contents of a mobile device being received or transferred, a court 
case can be lost. Incoming traffic from the network such as phone calls, messages or communication with 
installed apps can result in the contamination of potential evidence. In addition to this incoming traffic, it is 
possible that destruction mechanisms could be configured on the device which can result in the deletion of data 
or the locking of the device (Androulidakis, 2016). The following step in the aforementioned lifecycle is to 
ensure the preservation of the smartphone’s data. It is suggested by Rajendran and Gopalan (2016), in order to 
support data preservation, that electronic devices be stored in a Faraday bag.  
Faraday bags are described by Doherty (2016) as similar in appearance to antistatic bags, with the difference 
being that an antistatic bag will prevent damage to electronic devices from static electrical charges which have 
built up, whereas a Faraday bag poses the purpose of protecting electronic devices from external connectivity. 
Faraday bags are based on the concept of the Faraday cage, which is an enclosure which prevents external 
signals from reaching electronic devices. Doherty (2016) details the effectiveness of a Faraday bag being reliant 
on the materials of which it is made, the purpose of which is to stop wireless signals from penetrating the bag 
and reaching the device, which in turn supports the protection of the devices integrity from external influences. 
While awaiting examination, it is crucial that effective measures are taken which prevent any data which is 
stored on a device from being altered or remotely destroyed. Gershowitz (2013) identifies three operations 
which could be utilised in order to protect device integrity without utilising changes to the running applications 
so as switching off WiFi or entering Airplane Mode, these are: an extraction device that can copy phone 
contents to a secure offsite location; a Faraday bag; or alternatively a piece of aluminium foil. The benefits of 
the data extraction device at the time of seizure are evident. However, it is likely that high costs will be 
associated with such a device and it is unlikely that a forensic investigator or Police Officer will have such a 
device with them at all times. The benefit of using a Faraday bag is that once inside, a phone is no longer able to 
communicate with any external sources, and in turn, external sources are unable to reach a phone which is 
stored in a Faraday bag.  
Generally, the primary material which Faraday bags are made from is aluminium foil, which suggests that the 
utilisation of a simple solution such as wrapping a mobile device in aluminium foil may provide many of the 
same benefits as a Faraday bag. Although it is possible that aluminium foil may not completely prevent all 
attempts at communication with the wrapped device, it may act as a suitable intermediary process between the 
seizure of the device and the secure transportation and storage of a device until further actions can be taken with 
the potential evidence. In support of the Faraday option Androulidakis (2016) suggests that the best solution for 
isolating a device from the network and preserving its data is the use of a “Faraday Cage” which isolates 
electromagnetic radiation. It is stated that Faraday bags are smaller, more convenient option for device isolation. 
Ayers et al. (2014) define evidence preservation as the process for securely maintaining custody of a digital 
device without its contents being altered, and is the first step in digital evidence recovery. Incorrect procedures, 
or improper handling of a device can cause the loss or alteration of digital data. An inability to correctly 
preserve evidence can forfeit a whole investigation, and potentially lead to the loss of a legal case due to the 
acquired evidence being disrupted and therefore not standing up in court (Ayers et al., 2014). NIJ (2008) detail 
recommended items which first responders should have to comprise a “digital evidence collection toolkit” to 
assist them in performing their investigation in a forensically sound manner. Within this toolkit, alongside 
notepads, gloves, and a camera for documenting evidence, it is suggested that radio frequency shielding 
materials be on hand in the case that smartphones or other mobile communication devices are involved in an 
investigation and need to be securely seized. The specific radio frequency shielding materials which are 
suggested by NIJ (2008) are Faraday isolation bags, or aluminium foil. 
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NIJ (2008) emphasise the importance of leaving a mobile device in the power state in which it was found. If the 
phone is on when the first responders arrive, the phone should be left on, if it is powered off, then it should 
remain off; the device should then be packaged in a material which will shield it from incoming signals, in 
preparation for secure transportation. In contrast to this, SWDGE (2011) state that in the event a mobile device 
cannot be processed immediately, it should be powered off, its battery removed, and not turned back on. 
Benefits of turning mobile devices off include: the preservation of call logs and last cell tower location 
information (LOCI); avoiding overwriting of deleted data; stopping remote data destruction signals from 
reaching the device; and preventing accidental device usage such as messaging, dialling, and accessing and 
altering files and data. The risks of switching off the mobile device can result in the activation of security and 
authentication mechanisms such as PIN codes and passwords which further restrict access to the devices content 
(SWDGE, 2011). However, in support of NIJ’s (2008) claims, SWDGE (2011) state that in the event a mobile 
device must remain powered on, it should then be isolated from the network. Rather than suggesting the use of 
radio frequency shielding material to avoid the mobile device communicating with cell towers and in turn, 
altering the phones data, SWDGE (2011) propose that mobile devices can be switched to “Airplane” mode to 
limit their access to the towers, and where practical, first responders should disable the device’s WiFi, 
Bluetooth, RFID, and infrared communications. Whilst the guidelines provide for a range of procedures which 
at times are conflicting, it was decided for the purpose of these experiments that a forensic investigator would 
likely place the phone in a Faraday bag or other shielding material without altering any settings or switching off 
any technologies. 
There is currently a paucity of empirical research on the effectiveness of common Faraday bags for mobile 
signal shielding. There was even less available in regards to literature which provided findings, results or 
suggestions in relation to alternative materials which may be utilised in the place of Faraday bags for the 
purpose of blocking mobile signals from reaching a smartphone. That which could be derived from the literature 
surrounding alternative materials is the effectiveness of tinfoil regarding the blocking of signals can be 
attributed to its conductivity. This suggests that any conductive material such as copper, iron, and steel have the 
potential to create a barrier between a mobile device and radio signals or at least cause interference between the 
sending and receiving of frequency signals (Barrett, n.d.; Science Buddies, 2011). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The first step in the design of the experiments was to review several previous studies into shielding properties of 
various materials. None of these studies provided all necessary steps that were suitable for this research so ideas 
for testing were based on the previous research but with necessary modifications. As mobile devices may have 
up to three different wireless technologies active, 3G / 4G, WiFi and Bluetooth, it was decided to test all three. It 
was recognized that different phone manufacturers and models may provide differing results so six common 
phones from three different manufacturers were chosen for the tests.  Five easily available Faraday bags were 
chosen for testing representing four different manufacturers. To compliment these dedicated Faraday bags and 
to act as a comparison, tin foil and a tin can were added to test as these were materials that could likely be 
located by an investigator at a scene when a Faraday bag is not available. The experimental design is described 
in the following section. 
Experimental Design 
This research investigates the shielding and preservation capabilities of a range of different Faraday bags, with 
the main research question to be addressed being: What is the capability of Faraday bags and alternative 
materials for blocking mobile network, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth signals to mobile devices for the purpose of data 
preservation? This research provides an opportunity to explore the effectiveness of materials in supporting 
mobile evidence preservation in order to improve the mobile forensic investigation process. By providing a 
comparison of a range of available Faraday bags, in addition to two alternative household materials which could 
be used in the absence of Faraday bags, forensic investigators have the capability to identify materials which 
may be beneficial to their investigations, and provide support to the preservation of potential evidence. 
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 Table 1: Experimental phones & materials 
Mobile Devices  Shielding Materials 
Samsung Galaxy S3  Faraday Defence 3mm 
Samsung Galaxy S5 Tested with Faraday Defence 7mm 
Samsung Galaxy S7  EDEC Black Hole Faraday Bag 
Sony Xperia Z5  Blackout Faraday Shield 
Apple iPhone 5  ESD Faraday Cage Bag 
Samsung GT-B2710  Aluminium foil & Tin can 
 
Research Method 
To ensure consistent results, the same method was implemented for each mobile device and Faraday bag 
combination. The prerequisites for testing included: 
 A fully charged battery, due to the high drain nature of the testing 
 Device volume set to maximum to support identification of failed shielding where bags restrict vision 
and interaction 
 Installed and configured Viber application for placing and receiving calls through Wi-Fi connection 
 Bluetooth turned on, device visibility set as discoverable, and discovery timeout set to “Never” 
 Screen timeout set to the longest period available per device 
 Mobile Data turned off as to not interfere with the Wi-Fi tests 
Prior to shielding the receiving device, two calls will be placed, one over the network, and one over Wi-Fi, 
using the Viber application, to ensure that all required features were functioning appropriately. In addition, a 
Bluetooth search will be conducted from the transmitting device to ensure visibility of the phone being tested. 
The mobile device is placed in a Faraday bag and a timer pre-set for 30 second intervals over the duration of 
two minutes. Within every 30 second interval, a network call, and a Viber call is made from the transmission 
device, to the shielded, reception device. If the communications are received by the shielded device, the test will 
be considered a failure, and in the event no signals are received then a success is recorded. In the event the 
majority of results for a specific shielding bag have failed, the shielded device is placed within another bag, so 
that the device is nested within two bags of the same make and the testing process is then repeated. If after two 
bags the results are still mostly failures, the testing process is performed again with three nested bags. If after 
three nested bags the tests still fail, the Faraday bag in question will be considered completely ineffective. 
Independent tests are conducted for Bluetooth connectivity to determine the effectiveness of the shielding 
materials at varying distances, 1 metre, 3 metres, 5 metres and 10 metres. In the event of a failed test, the nesting 
approach will not be implemented for the Bluetooth testing but instead the distance between the transmitting and 
shielded receiving device will be increased. If after 10 metres Bluetooth communication can still be established, 
the material being tested will be considered ineffective. 
RESULTS  
The 7 shielding materials, 5 Faraday bags, tin foil and a tin box were all tested using similar parameters. Of 
primary interest is the 3G / 4G shielding capabilities as this is the communication technology that provides the 
capability to alter the data on the phone from a considerable distance.  The results of the experiments are shown 
in figure 1 where the vertical bar represents a failure to shield the reception. 
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Figure 1. 3G / 4G Call Failures  
 
Of the 7 tested scenarios, only the EDEC Black Hole Faraday Bag and the aluminium foil shielded all 18 calls 
from penetrating to the device. The time of the phone call had minimal impact on the measured ability of the 
material so that a very short call is a good indication of whether the material is effective or not. Whilst the 
Faraday Defense 3mm performed the worst of the 7, 4 other materials let through at least one of the calls. 
Surprisingly, tin foil performed equally to the best Faraday Bag with no calls getting through to the device. The 
next communication technology tested is WiFi as this technology has potential communication distances of 
several hundreds of metres. The results for the WiFi tests are shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. WiFi Call Failures 
 
The 2.4GHz WiFi tests show that the most effective material is the EDEC Black Hole Faraday Bag with none of 
the communication attempts able to penetrate the bag. The other materials let through at least 2 of the attempts 
at communication with aluminium foil allowing as many attempts as several of the other scenarios.  The final 
communication technology tested is Bluetooth and the results for this experiment are shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Bluetooth Call Failures 
 
For the Bluetooth tests, the distance between the devices has a noticeable impact on the effectiveness of the 
materials and this can be expected with the very limited range of Bluetooth. The following tables 2 – 6 show the 
results for the various phone models with the 5 Faraday bags. Ticks indicate that the signal has penetrated the 
bag where a cross indicates a successful shielding of the signal. 
 
Table 2: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Faraday Defence 0.3mm 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3     

x    
Samsung Galaxy S5     

    
Samsung Galaxy S7     

    
Sony Xperia Z5       x    
Apple iPhone 5     

    
Basic Phone     

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
Table 3: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Faraday Defence 0.7mm 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3 x x x x x 
 
    
Samsung Galaxy S5  x x x x 
 
    
Samsung Galaxy S7 x x x x x 
 
    
Sony Xperia Z5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Apple iPhone 5  x x  

 x x x x 
Basic Phone x x  x x 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
Table 4: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for EDEC Faraday Bag 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Samsung Galaxy S5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Samsung Galaxy S7 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Sony Xperia Z5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Apple iPhone 5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Basic Phone x x x x x 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Table 5: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Faraday Cage ESD Bag 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3     

    
Samsung Galaxy S5     

    
Samsung Galaxy S7 x x x x x 
 
    
Sony Xperia Z5 x x x x x 
 
x    
Apple iPhone 5     

    
Basic Phone     

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
Table 6: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Blackout Faraday Shield 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3     

    
Samsung Galaxy S5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Samsung Galaxy S7 x x x x x 
 
    
Sony Xperia Z5 x x x x x 
 
 x   
Apple iPhone 5   x x 

x x x x x 
Basic Phone     

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
Of particular interest in these results is that whilst only the EDEC Faraday bag is successful in all experiments, 
other bags have varied success depending on the mobile phone make and model, which different models from 
the same manufacturer providing different results. Tables 7 and 8 show the results for the aluminium foil and tin 
can as a shielding material. 
 
Table 7: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Aluminium Foil 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Samsung Galaxy S5 x x x x x 
 
x    
Samsung Galaxy S7 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Sony Xperia Z5 x x x x x 
 
    
Apple iPhone 5 x x x x x 
 
    
Basic Phone x x x x x 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
Table 8: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Tin Box 
 
3G/4G 
 
Wi-Fi 
 
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 0s 30s 60s 90s 120s 
Samsung Galaxy S3 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Samsung Galaxy S5 x x x x x 
 
    
Samsung Galaxy S7 x x x x x 
 
    
Sony Xperia Z5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Apple iPhone 5 x x x x x 
 
x x x x x 
Basic Phone     
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Table 7 indicates that aluminium foil can be utilised for 3G / 4G signal shielding and is successful at shielding 
the Sony Xperia Z5 and Iphone 5 from WiFi signals. In contrast, the tin box will prevent signal penetration of 
3G / 4G for the basic phone which is not equipped with WiFi and will shield against WiFi for the Samsung 
Galaxy S5 and S7 only. These results clearly show that no one rule for shielding material can be applied in all 
circumstances with all phones or all technologies. 
CONCLUSION  
The use of Faraday bags, and in exceptional circumstances other materials to prevent unwanted radio 
communications with seized wireless devices is an accepted and vital addition to the forensic investigators 
toolkit. Forensic evidence is only of evidentiary value if it is maintained in the state that it was seized in without 
modification or alteration. The ready availability of Faraday bags at little cost would seem to allow investigators 
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to cheaply equip themselves with Faraday bags in readiness for a mobile phone seizure. However, the results of 
this research show that only one of the 5 tested bags consistently provided reliable protection from radio waves 
penetrating the bag. This same bag provided radio wave blocking for all 3 tested communication technologies 
and surprisingly aluminium foil was as reliable in all but blocking of WiFi signals. The other bags, even when 
nested inside each other to provide greater protection failed to completely block the radio signals with selections 
of phones but that only testing of the phones and materials provided a guide as to their effectiveness. It is not 
sufficient to estimate the effectiveness based on how they perform with some phones and extrapoloate the results 
to incorporate untested phones. The forensic investigator should be aware that not all bags are of equal reliability 
and the choice of which bag to utilise from which manufacturer should be made after reviewing rigorous testing 
procedures such as these to ascertain their effectiveness. Additionally, should a reliable bag not be available, 
aluminium foil will serve as an emergency measure provided the WiFi on the device is disabled by the 
investigator.  
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Abstract 
Remote Desktop Applications (RDA) such as Virtual Network Computing (VNC), Cisco WebEx, GoToMeeting 
and LogMeIn have been adapted and utilised recently. This is because they facilitate tier-one support to 
configure computers, networks and solve application-related issues from a remote location. The direct benefit 
from the use of these applications, is the time (and therefore cost) saving for organisations. Unfortunately, 
“remoting” technology can also be used by criminals to perform illegal activities, hence remote applications are 
of key interest to law agencies and forensic investigators. The research outlined in this paper aims to identify 
any artefacts left behind by common remote applications and technologies used by many firms. These artefacts 
can be vital to government law enforcement agencies and forensic investigators, as they could be used as 
evidence in cyber-crime investigations. This research will focus on RealVNC, TightVNC, Cisco WebEx, 
GoToMeeting and LogMeIn applications. The findings from the research shows some artefacts left behind by the 
applications, which can be used by forensics investigators or law enforcement for possible evidence. 
Keywords 
Virtual Network Computing, Computer Forensics, Encryption, Computer Security, Remote Desktop 
INTRODUCTION 
RDA allow organisations and individuals to access a computer or network remotely, where physical access to 
the network is not available or where access to the device is impractical. Such applications facilitate access to 
computers as though a user is sitting right in front of his/her computer. There are various types of RDA currently 
used by many organisations and individuals such as VNC, LogMeIn, Citrix GoToMyPc, LogMeIn and 
TeamViewer. The increasing adoption and use RDA has also increased the potential for cyber threats to be 
realised against organisations  
However, using the application can be slow over the internet depending on the Internet connection speeds. Some 
remote applications such as VNC have had security issues in past due to using weaker encryption 
implementations (Kerai, 2010). It is plausible that similar issues exist in other remote applications, or still exist 
in VNC. 
In this paper, we detect and retrieve any artefacts left behind by RDA on a Windows computer. Client software 
for five common remote applications (RealVNC, TightVNC, LogMeIn, Teamviewer and Citrix GoToMyPc) will 
be installed individually on a Windows 10 computer, and test remote connections will be initiated that we expect 
will create configuration changes on the computer. The information will be forensically analysed to find any 
artefacts left by the application on the computer. The paper outlines the location of the artefacts and the types of 
information left by the application.  
RealVNC, TightVNC, LogMeIn, Teamviewer and Citrix GoToMyPc remote applications was used for to 
conduct the research. The findings will show whether the R leave any artefacts, and this can help law 
enforcements for forensic investigations. 
BACKGROUND 
Computer forensics is computer science used to aid legal process in investigations (Brown, 2006). It is the 
process of obtaining, identifying, extracting, analysing and documenting digital evidence for use as evidence in 
legal case (Brown, 2006; Kerai, 2010). However, forensics analysis need to be followed in a defined procedure 
which is accept by the law court. A guideline defined in HB171 (HB171, 2003) is currently used as a guide to 
carry out forensics investigations and manage electronic evidence.  
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It is important to follow a standard procedure when performing acquisition of electronic evidence when 
performing a forensic investigation (Hannay, 2008). It is important to acquire the evidence without modifying or 
damaging it and validating the evidence is the same as original. This is done by chain of custody and 
documentation.  
Forensic analysis for remote protocols has been an area of interest for the law enforcements and other 
government and state agencies. This is because these applications can be used to also perform cyber-crimes and 
illegal communications. A previous research done by (Kerai, 2010), showed that VNC and Microsoft Remote 
Desktop Protocol left behind artefacts, connection and application logs on a computer system locally. The 
research showed that the VNC application and Remote Desktop Protocol leaves some artefacts on the Windows 
Registry File System and other also connection and other application logs on the computer system locally. 
REMOTE DESKTOP APPLICATIONS 
Demand for RDA has increased with time, where a user can remotely connect, manage and configure another 
computer or networks. Connectivity between a user’s computer to another remote computer can be achieved 
with readily available hardware and software to connect you virtually to any remote network. The constraint is 
cost and bandwidth issue that is associated with some technologies (Hoogenboom & Steemers, 2000).  
There are various remote desktop applications and technologies available in recent years that can be used to 
remote in and fix a computer related issues. Online tools like LogMeIn and Citrix GoToMyPc are easy to use, 
reliable and secure (TeamViewer, 2016). However, standalone applications such as RealVNC, TightVNC, 
UltraVNC, Teamviewer and others are applications will require the user to configure the application on the 
computer for a remote connection, which may require some technical skills.  
VNC (Virtual Network Computing) - VNC was first developed by the Olivetti and Oracle Laboratory as their 
telephony system. Later the technology was acquired by AT&T labs and the owners of the technology formed 
RealVNC to continue working with the remote technology.  
The VNC application uses a Remote Frame Buffer protocol to remote access a graphical user interface of the 
connected device. The application uses TCP 5900 and TCP 5800 for web based remote access. Hence it enables 
users and organisation to access network resources remotely over the internet. The application has two 
independent versions, the client and the server, both versions run on most operating system platforms. This 
makes it very popular as anyone using Windows operating system can remote in to a Linux-based computer or 
Mac OSX based computer and vice versa. However, a server instance needs to be installed on a computer and a 
client is then used to access the server. Previous research has shown and discussed the results on how the VNC 
connection works and the security features and weakness it has (Kerai, 2010).  
Other remote support applications such as LogMeIn, GoToMyPc and Teamviewer use TCP port 443 and have 
different application architecture and implementation than VNC application, due to them being web client based 
rather than standalone. Hence the artefacts might be different compared to VNC application.  
Next session outlines the lab setup and materials used to analyse the remote applications. The research outlines 
artefacts left by the applications and individual or remote connection information. These artefacts and 
information can be used by forensics investigators and law agencies in court of law as evidence, in a cyber-crime 
related criminal case. 
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EXPERIMENTAL SETUP  
Various software and tools were used during the data collection, acquisition and analysis of the raw dd image of 
the Windows operating systems (see table 1). Different virtual machines and images were used to analyse the 
application independently.  
Table 1: Tools used in Experiments 
Applications 
VMware Workstation v12 
professional 
Windows 10 operating system was installed and created separate instances of 
each application for analysis. 
Remote Desktop Applications  Real VNC version 5.3.2 
 TightVNC version 2.7.10 
 Citrix GoToMyPC 
 Teamviewer 
 LogMeIn 
Password Recovery Tools  Abel and Cain v 4.9.35 – This is a password recovery and sniffing 
tool used to capture network traffic and sniff passwords. 
 VNCPass 
 VNCSniff 
Windows File System Tools  Microsoft Sysinternal Suite 
ANALYSIS  
All RDA were independently analysed on a virtual machine running the Windows 10 operating system. An 
ADSL router by default does not have remote connections to computers externally, this is because the router 
does not have remote protocol ports open on the router firewall. For VNC connection to work the user needs to 
open TCP port 5900 and TCP port 5800 for the Java client. However other mentioned remote applications run on 
TCP port 443, therefore they do not need special ports opened on the router. Once a VNC application is installed 
on a computer it automatically opens the ports on the local Windows firewall.  
VNC applications use Data Encryption Standard (DES)which has proven to be insecure due to its small key size 
(56-bit). Due the weak encryption algorithm, an attacker can sniff the traffic after cracking the encrypted 
password. 
Windows Registry Analysis 
The Windows registry is a central hierarchical database used by the Windows Operating System, to store all the 
information that is necessary to configure and manage applications and hardware devices installed on the system 
(MicrosoftSupport, 2016). The registry hive is a group of root keys and sub keys that contain application data 
(Alghafli, Jones, & Martin, 2010). There are five logical hives in the Windows Registry, the application registry 
values are most stored under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE and HKEY_USERS 
registry hives. 
RealVNC  
RealVNC configuration is stored in the Windows registry, including encrypted login passwords, settins and 
outbound connections made to the RealVNC servers. The default Windows registry viewer was used to analyse 
the data and artefacts of the application. The connection server password used by the RealVNC server is 
encrypted with DES encryption, since DES encryption is weak, the password can be retrieved easily. Tools such 
as Cain and Abel, VNC Crack and online password cracking web services can crack DES encryption with no 
cost, due to readily available tool to decrypt the encryption. Table 2 shows the artefacts left by RealVNC 
application on Windows 10 machine. 
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Table 2: RealVNC Windows Registry Analysis 
Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncviewer\MRU, the application 
stores all the history of the external IP addresses connections made to an external VNC 
server.  
Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncserver, the application 
stores encrypted password of the RealVNC server. The password is encrypted with DES 
encryption standard. Since DES is a weak encryption standard, decrypting the password is 
possible.  
Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncserver, the application also 
stores configuration settings such as, if the application is personal or enterprise edition, RSA 
private key and the authentication scheme used. 
Under the HKEY_USERS\Software\RealVNC\vncserver, the application stores the vncserver 
license key. 
 
 
Table 3: RealVNC Logs on Windows File System 
 The application leaves log information in the Windows Event Viewer under the Application Logs. The 
logs show client IP address that made the connection to the RealVNC server, and the connection logs 
for the computer made a connection to another VNC server. 
 The RealVNC application stores the connections and application log settings on the hard drive. The log 
file includes all the connection details, including the client IP address and any files transferred during 
the connection. The file is located under C:\Program Files\RealVNC\VNC Server\Logs or C:\Program 
Files (x86) \RealVNC\VNC Server\Logs. 
However, by default the application logging is not enabled, therefore a user will need to enable logging 
for the logs to be generated. 
 By default, Windows Firewall logs are not enabled, therefore no log information is kept if a VNC 
connection is made inbound or outbound. However, if the Windows firewall logging is enabled, then 
the VNC connection is logged on the log file. The firewall log file is located under 
C:/Windows/System32/LogFiles/Firewall 
 The application stores the chat conversation logs under the folder 
C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\RealVNC.  
TightVNC  
TightVNC is a free application, and works the same way as RealVNC. The application also stores the 
application settings and logging information on both the Windows Registry structure and locally on the 
computer hard drive. The connection server password used by the TIghtVNC server is encrypted with DES 
encryption, in a similar way to how RealVNC server encrypts its password. As stated early the encryption is 
weak and can be defeated easily to retrieve the server password. The table below shows the artefacts left by 
RealVNC application on Windows 10 machine. 
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Table 4: TightVNC Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server, the application stores the 
configuration settings for the TightVNC server, this includes also the encrypted password for the 
server. This password is used to connect to the server.  
 Just like RealVNC the connection password is encrypted with DES and therefore password can be 
attacked with password cracking tools. 
 Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Viewer, the application stores all the 
connection history of the local computer making VNC connections outbound. Therefore, the registry 
key stores all the IP addresses the TightVNC server has made connection to another external VNC 
server.  
 Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server, the application also stores the 
configuration settings for the TightVNC server, this includes also the encrypted password for the 
server. This password is used to connect to the server. 
 
Table 5: TightVNC Logs on Windows File System 
 The application leaves log information in the Windows Event Viewer under the Application Logs. The 
logs show client IP address that made the connection to the TightVNC server, and the connection logs 
for the computer made a connection to another VNC server. 
 The application stores the connections and application log settings on the hard drive. The log file 
includes all the connection details, including the client IP address and any files transferred during the 
connection. The file is located under C:\ProgramData\TightVNC\ Server\Logs. 
However, by default the application logging is not enabled, therefore a user will need to enable logging 
for the logs to be generated.  
 Also, the application does not log any outgoing VNC connections, therefore if a user makes a VNC 
connection to an external VNC server, no logging information is kept by the application. 
 By default, Windows Firewall logs are not enabled, therefore no log information is kept if a VNC 
connection is made inbound or outbound. However, if the Windows firewall logging is enabled, then 
the VNC connection is logged on the log file. The firewall log file is located under 
C:/Windows/System32/LogFiles/Firewall 
 
Citrix GoToMyPc 
Citrix GoToMyPc is an application that can be used to access remote computers over internet connection. Unlike 
VNC applications, GoToMyPc application does not require client and server, allowing invitations to other users 
to remotely access their computer. The connection is done over HTTPS 443 TCP port; therefore, it does not 
require to have an independent port open on the firewall to work.  
The user initially will need to register on the Citrix GoToMyPc website and add remote computers to the 
registered account. However, the remote computers need to have a GoToMyPc installation to receive the remote 
connections. User will need to log in to the account and then initiate a remote connection by selecting the 
computer defined on the user account. Someone can also send out an invite to connect a computer that is not 
registered to the account and initiate a connection if accepted by the guest user. The application uses end to end 
encryption during the remote connection using the AES 128bit encryption standards (GoToMyPc, 2016). The 
table below shows the artefacts left by RealVNC application on a Windows 10 machine. 
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Table 6: GoToMyPc Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\Citrix\GoToMyPc, the application stores all the 
configuration settings. The settings include encrypted access code with Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) 128-bit encryption standard, email address of the person the account is registered under and 
other various settings. 
 The application also keeps are the records of guest invites send to connect to the GoToMyPc 
workstation. These settings can be located under 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\Citrix\GoToMyPc\GuestInvite. 
 Under the registry value 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Citrix\GoToMyPc\FileTransfer\history and 
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-97110503-761733263-3747825532-
1001\SOFTWARE\Citrix\GoToMyPc\FileTransfer\history, the application stores the hostname of the 
computer made the remote connection, including the location of any files transferred during the remote 
session process. 
 
Citrix GoToMyPc application did not log any access or connection logs on the local computer. The application 
instead stores the connection logs on the user’s GoToMyPc online account. Hence no logs were available on the 
local computer of any type of connections made or received. Also, no connection or applications logs were 
stored on the Windows Event Viewer logs.  
Teamviewer 
Teamviewer is an organisation founded in 2005 in Germany that provides web based collaboration solutions and 
remote desktop capable support to the users. The application can be used by users to remotely control another 
computer that has the application installed on it. The application works over TCP port 443 and uses RSA 
public/private key exchange and AES 256-bit session encryption to secure the connection traffic (TeamViewer, 
2016). The table below outlines artefacts left behind by the application on the Windows Registry File Structure. 
Table 7: Teamviewer Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Teamviewer; registry key value, it stores the 
application settings including the account name of the Teamviewer account. This is the email address 
used to login on to the Teamviewer account. The application also stores the username of the local 
computer. 
 Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\TeamViewer and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-
97110503-761733263-3747825532-1001\SOFTWARE\Teamviewer; registry values, the application 
stores the all the encryption keys and certificates that is generated, when a remote connection is 
initiated and other Teamviewer settings. 
Table 8: Teamviewer Logs on Windows File System 
 The application stores the incoming connection logs under the C:\Program Files (x86) 
\TeamViewer\Connections_incoming, the file includes all the incoming connections to the computer. 
However, Teamviewer doesnot use an IP address or email address for initiating a remote connection, 
instead it uses a unique random generate number, which is used as a ID to initiate a connection.  
 Under the same folder C:\Program Files (x86) \TeamViewer\, Teamviewer stores a log file named 
“TeamViewer11_Logile”, this file contains all the remote connection information, including the client 
ID, the public IP address of the client that made the connection, log entries for any files transferred 
during the remote session. This is crucial for the forensic investigation as it can be used to track down 
an individual with a Public IP address. 
 
The application stored no connection or applications logs were stored on the Windows Event Viewer logs. 
 
47
  
LOGMEIN 
LogMeIn provides remote connectivity solutions to organisation for collaboration and IT management. The 
organisation was found in 2003 and provides servers to user to access and connect to remote computers. The 
LogMeIn client initially establishes a connection to LogMeIn servers and authenticates itself with a TLS1.X 
certificate. Once the identity is verified the user can then connect to and exchange data to another host to 
computer associated to the LogMeIn account. The application uses TLS based certificate authentication and uses 
AES or Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption 128-bit or 256-bit encryption standards (LogMeIn, 
2016). The table below outlines artefacts left behind by the application on the Windows Registry File Structure. 
Table 9: LogMeIn Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\Toolkit\DesktopSharing, 
the application stores the last guest recipient email address used to invite a user to remote into the 
computer. 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\Toolkit\Filesharing, the 
application last guest recipient email address used to share a file transfer from the computer. 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn, the application stores all 
the configuration settings and user preferences. The registry value also stores user guest invite settings. 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\V5\WebSvc\Shared, the 
application stores details about any files shared to the remote user. 
 
Table 10: LogMeIn Logs on Windows File System 
 LogMeIn application logs all the connection logs both incoming and outgoing to a log files located 
under the C:\ProgramData\LogMeIn folder. There are two logs files that contain connection settings 
including the public IP address of the remote user and basic remote connection settings used for the 
connection.  
 The log files also contain information about file transfers and send over to remote computer, such as 
name of the file, location of the file and file type. 
 The logs also contain details any incoming remote connections initiated to the computer by an external 
remote user. This includes the public IP address of the computer initiating the remote connection. 
 The application incoming and outgoing remote connection is stored and captured on the Windows 
event viewer, under the Application logs. The log entry stores public IP address of the guest user 
connecting to the computer.  
 Once the remote user ends the connection or logged out, another log entry is created capturing the 
event with the IP address and the time stamp of the connection. 
 
As identified above on the results, the RDA do leave behind useful artefacts such as IP addresses and email 
addresses of individuals who have remoted in a computer. This information can be used by law agencies and 
forensic investigators to prosecute or assist them to develop their investigations further. The application 
incoming and outgoing remote connection is stored and captured on the Windows event viewer, under the 
Application logs. The log entry stores public IP address of the guest user connecting to the computer. The logs 
also show information such as file name, type and location of files been transferred to the remote computer. This 
can be used to find exactly what the kind of files were transferred and the location of the file on the local and 
remote computer. All the applications store some sort of encrypted credentials and certificates on Windows 
registry hive. However, VNC applications store server connection password on DES encryption standard, a less 
secure and can be cracked easily by password cracking tools. 
Comparing the results of previous research done by (Kerai, 2010), there is not a much difference on how RDA 
leave behind artefacts. Especially RealVNC and TightVNC applications do leave behind reasonable number of 
artefacts including the connection encrypted password used by the applications  
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CONCLUSION 
Remote desktop applications provide end users and organisations the ability to remote in to networks and 
computers to manage and troubleshooting network related issues. Due to its ease and graphical interface, the 
adoption of remote access application is rapidly increasing. There are benefits of RDA to organisations and 
individuals, however the technology can also be exploited by criminals, cyber groups and terrorist groups to 
perform illegal activities on remote computers and networks. 
As shown above, several RDA leave behind local artefacts which can be of importance to forensic investigation. 
This is a large impact to government law enforcements agencies and forensics investigators to recover any 
potential artefacts left behind by the applications on the computer for further investigations. The artefacts can be 
used to investigate crimes committed by individuals who have transferred explicit, illegal and terrorism relates 
materials and documents over the remote connection. 
The research conducted has verified that the remote applications do leave artefacts behind and can be assessed 
and reviewed in forensically sound manner. Further research will explore and compare other remote 
applications, along with evaluating the applications use on different operating systems. Providing further 
important artefacts that can be of a forensic interest.  
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Abstract 
The Pacific Islands are seriously challenged by the growth in wealth and the expansion of international material 
possessions. On the roads traffic has grown dramatically and the types of vehicles now using Island roads has 
greatly changed. With the importation of cheap second hand vehicles designed for freeway speeds serious safety 
issues have grown proportionally with the increasing numbers. In this research we consider the prohibitive costs 
of traditional traffic controls to economy and propose a light weight highly mobile aerial surveillance system 
that integrates with ground policing capability. Our research question was: How can road safety and security be 
enhanced with economical technologies? In addition to collecting and processing live data we have also 
designed a forensically ready system, and an information system to process the large amounts of data generated 
by the addition of these technologies into the traffic surveillance processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aerial surveillance has a long history of use in the military for monitoring activities on the ground 
(CambraBascca et al., 2013). Commercially, aerial surveillance is used for monitoring resources such as forests, 
crops, coast lines, aerial news gathering, and search and rescue.  The surveillance activities have relied initially 
on the human eye and binoculars but now have moved towards sophisticated cameras and digital technologies.  
These images can be reviewed in real time or can be examined at a later date for forensic analysis and evidence. 
With regards to traffic surveillance in particular, the increase in the number of vehicles on road has led transport 
management agencies to seek the use of advanced technologies that can provide better information more cheaply 
in order to service informed decisions and road safety. This requires collection of precise and accurate 
information about the state of traffic, conformance, behaviours and road conditions. It is also required to get 
timely information in case of emergencies (accidents, and so on). In the case of accidents, the time of response is 
critical in victim survivability and with increased traffic volumes even emergency vehicles struggle to reach 
incident scenes in a timely fashion. Traditional surveillance methods do not prove to be time effective or cost 
effective. They can provide useful information about traffic flows but cannot provide useful information 
regarding traffic flows over a space of time including the vehicle trajectories, routing information and real-time 
movements (Cheng et al., 2012).  
Traffic information is the foundation of traffic management, traffic control, and transportation planning. 
However, many rural and some urban road segments are not installed with any fixed traffic detectors due to the 
high cost and historically low volumes. In addition in many of the built-up city areas with high surveillance the 
motorists have learnt behaviour regarding fixed cameras and mobile vehicles, and have change their behaviour to 
only comply when a surveillance instrument is present. This is exactly why my research is aiming to see if the 
using of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) will be effective in the Kingdom of Tonga for improving 
the flow of information for the control of vehicle traffic. Additionally, mobile traffic sensors are not broadly 
used, which leads to low traffic information acquisition.  As a new tool, UAV or civil drone has its unique 
advantages of flexibility and mobility, wide view scope, and low cost compared with traditional fixed systems. 
Hence, in this work, UAVs are introduced to monitor road segments and to identify the problems and challenges 
that would face a full implementation. At present UAVs have many limitations that require management. Some 
of the challenges are battery life, attenuation of signals, camera cost, large datasets, lack of training, and other 
issues that will be documented in this research. 
 This paper is structured to review the background context, look at visual data processing, consider the big data 
problem, and to propose an integrated visual surveillance system for traffic management. The research 
contribution is the problem evaluation and design solution proposed. 
50
PROBLEM BACKGROUND 
Tonga has very small islands with over one hundred thousand people in population. Consequently small 
lightweight UAVs even with their current capabilities of endurance are effective tools for monitoring behaviours 
on the road (Dijk et al., 2013). Tonga does not have any traffic lights even in the most populated areas and few 
fixed surveillance cameras. There appears to be a need for some kind of electronic device that will assist the 
Tonga Police in their traffic duties, that is economically effective and efficient. The objectives for this research 
are to match the suitability of current off-the-shelf drones under $5000 to the task of traffic surveillance (Cusack 
& Khaleghparast, 2005); and, then to propose the design for information management system. There are also 
other practical questions to be considered. For example, Are the weather conditions in Tonga suitable? What 
about from January to April in the hurricane season? Also there is the consideration of other applications of these 
lightweight surveillance devices. For example, are they useful for other needs such as searching, Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Fire department or any other commercial need. These are very important areas in Tonga also. The 
question is, are we able to adopt some kind of framework that will help our traffic conformance as well as the 
other needs using the civil drones? Because the most important issue here is the safety of the people and if the 
civil drone can economically add value they should be more widely used. 
Traffic conformance audit on roads is maintained by a mixture of surveillance devices and techniques (Coifman 
et al., 2004; Goradia & Xi, 2012). A compliant vehicle is one which delivers the transportation service within a 
profile of measurable attributes that conform to the usage contract. These attributes include behaviour, speed, 
mechanical safety, registration, licensing and so on. The usage contract has a wide variety of requirements that 
cover different vehicles, human factors and situations. Traffic intelligence can be gathered from a wide range of 
sensor networks. The most important aspect of using this intelligence is reference. References are found when 
for example the speed of the vehicle is compared with the conformance contract. A bus or a truck for example 
has a different conformance contract than a motorcar. Similarly matters of weight, size, registration, and so on 
all fall within the spectrum of traffic surveillance and intelligence gathering. Each instance on the road has a 
different conformance contract and some contracts overlap. The overall result is that any data which is collected 
has to be assessed against the reference data or template. Consequently the information processing around sensor 
networks has to be tuned to automate the lower-level decision-making processes and to filter out compliant 
information (Kastrinaki et al., 2003; Ahmed et al., 2012). Persons deciding how to act require only selective 
information that is about variations to conformance. 
When the information processing processes are automated information may be fed directly to law enforcement 
or an investigating officer. For example sensors on roads may indicate that a vehicle is overweight or over height 
or travelling with excessive speed or dangerously (Bakhtari et al., 2006; Amran et al., 2014). For this to happen 
the primary data has to be processed in such a way that the information provided for decision-makers is 
summative in nature and represents previous determinations against benchmarks. To achieve this level of 
sophistication highly intelligent information systems are required to support a sensor network. This would mean 
that when adding UAVs to a surveillance network that the extra intelligence data can be processed into useful 
information for the decision-makers effectively and efficiently. The software and the computational algorithms 
required have to be built into the information system to support the higher-level decision-making capability. In 
practical terms this means that a match between an image of a vehicle and a database is required in order to find 
information such as the current warrant fitness, the current owner and other useful information that can lead to 
those responsible for the conformance contract. 
VISUAL DATA COLLECTION 
A quad-copter drone was used to take video footages of vehicles travelling over city streets. These video 
footages were then used as the input of the data processing life cycle that was used to automatically process 
number plates and speed data. The data could be processed either on the drone motherboard, stored for later 
analysis or in our case we beamed directly back in real time to a laptop processing unit. We calculated vehicle 
speed and number plate recognition using the following processes. 
Generally, a license plate detection system has to solve two problems: where a license plate is located and how 
big it is (Howell, 2015). Usually, the candidate position of characters in the license plate is first identified, and 
the bounding box of the license plate is determined later. There are many challenges in license plate detection in 
an open environment, such as various observation angles from cameras, background clutter, differently sized 
license plates, poor image quality from uneven lighting conditions, and multi-plate detection. In terms of drone 
traffic surveillance in Tonga, the increase in the number of road users today has led to evaluating the use of 
technologies for monitoring and control. However, the environment posed extra challenges for instance, the 
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existence of tree branches over public roads, low overhead phone and power lines and tall coconut trees near 
roads. These can be major obstruction as they block the drone’s view and hide vital evidence.      
The Quad-copter that was used to take images for data collection purpose in this study used ISO-100, shutter 
6400, EV-1 and Fnum-F2.8 camera settings. Figure 1 specifies the steps in image processing that we used. Step 
one deals with image acquisition, two deals with pre-processing processes which concerns with ways that 
increases the chances for success. Step three deals with partitioning of the image into parts or objects and step 
four concerns with the conversion of the input data into a form that is suitable for computer processing. Step five 
deals with the description of the image. This is concerning the extraction of the features that can be used to 
differentiate one object from the other. Step six deals with recognition of the image, assigning a label to an 
object based on its descriptors. Final step is concerned with the interpretation of the image to assign meaning to 
the recognised objects. We developed this model in the research and applied it to the actual processing of 
numberplates. The number plate processing required morphological processes, a conversion of the colour 
imagery from the drone camera to greyscale is, and then a cropping and a dilation of the image so that only the 
number plate could be fed through the character recognition algorithm. With the limited number (6) of characters 
on a number plate processing was very quick. When the system is connected to a reference database then 
immediate data match can be achieved to find the owner of the conformance contract. 
The speak calculations could proceed in two fashions. The simplest way is to take time elapses as vehicles move 
between measured points. However the resultant is an average speed and the distance between the markers has to 
be sufficient that the entry image and exit image are distinct, and that the margins for visual error calculations 
are also factored. Consequently we opted for pixel by pixel image processing to calculate instantaneous speeds. 
Drone traffic surveillance provides many advantages for instance; low cost, easy to deploy, high mobility, large 
view scope, uniform scale, and so on (Goradia & Xi, 2012; The Economist, 2015). The drone can adjust its 
flying altitude in order to capture the target object from various angles in order to have the best image. However, 
data captured by drones contains much more complex information than traditional surveillance video. Footages 
captured by drone contain not only the traditional data such as traffic flow information but also 360o level data 
for each vehicle such as vehicle's trajectory data, lane change data and the cars around data on the road. As a 
result, extracting a moving object from video frames is a challenge. 
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Figure 1: Four phases of image processing employed in this study. 
 
Each vehicle’s speed includes two directions – longitudinal and lateral. Usually the lateral value can be assumed 
to be 0 unless the vehicle makes a lane change. If that happens, the value will change accordingly but relatively 
small compared to the longitudinal speed. In terms of footage from the drone, any movements in the lateral 
direction can be the drone’s camera motion. In order to minimize this type of errors, only the velocity of vehicle 
along the road longitudinal direction is considered, which can be expressed by 
 
It is possible to acquire each pixel’s velocity however, due to the variability nature of the optical flow at pixel 
level; the accuracy of the vehicle’s speed obtained is questionable. As a result, the optical flow is used to detect 
the shape of each vehicle, and the value of  is converted into a binary value in the following equation where 
τ and σ are the maximum and minimum rational speeds. 
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This relates to the drone’s altitude and its stability when the image is captured.  
 
Figure 2: speed calculation images 
 
Drones have proven to be beneficial, effective and efficient in observing and surveilling activities on the ground 
(Kovar, 2015; Paganini, 2015). However, calculating speed of moving vehicles from a moving camera such as 
those on drones in real-time is a difficult task due to the potential variability in moving frames, movement and 
vibration of the drone’s camera in the air caused by wind force, the vehicle will change its position on the video 
as it is travelling so the angle will change accordingly. The settings of the drone’s camera might also change 
such as its brightness values and colours. As a result, stationary and moving cameras call for different processing 
approaches. In our research we produce the computational algorithms for both instances but only did the 
calculations and practice for a stable drone. Hence, when the image from the drone’s footage is acquired, the 
point of interest is characterised by its vector features composed of 128 values. The feature matching process 
started continuously in order to detect changing similarity points and to filter the most stable estimate. The 
filtering process delivers two images of the vehicle that are very close in time, and hence the distance covered by 
each image object can be simply computed. 
BIG DATA PROBLEMS 
The current technologies used for traffic surveillance seem to be inadequate, inasmuch as, purposely placed 
cameras can only photograph speeding vehicles or vehicles proceeding through red lights. Such images cannot 
give investigators information such as behaviour of the driver that leads to a traffic accident. For instance, were 
they weaving all over the road even though they were driving slowly? This type of question needs a different 
type of monitoring system. However, although there are many benefits of such system, the main challenge is 
managing big data issues (Rowlingson, 2004; Pooe et al., 2012). The small digital cameras are very efficient and 
they produce huge amounts of image and other metric data. Big data is a term used to describe sets of electronic 
data both structured and unstructured, that are large and complex. The current data processing techniques or 
methods, database applications and software are insufficient. The main issues of big data include capturing, 
searching, storage, analysis, query and updating and managing information privacy just to name a few. If this is 
the case then the question is, how big is big data? An example of big data might be Petabytes (1,024 terabytes) 
or Exabyte (1,024 petabytes) of data consisting of billions to trillions of records. From the data that was 
collected for this study, a 60 seconds of footage from the quad-copter equals to 446.25MB of video data, this 
was taken with ISO-100, shutter 6400, EV-1 and Fnum-F2.8 at 25 frames per second, a rate of 60Mbps. At this 
rate, a drone that can take 30 minutes of video, that is 446.25 x 30 = 13 Gigabytes and 387.5 Megabytes of data. 
This amount of data will multiply by the number of hours worked each day, and by the number of drones being 
used by the police department. In terms of storage, if the traffic surveillance system in Tonga employs five quad-
copters, video footage streaming from five drones will be 133 Gigabytes and 875 Megabytes of data. Even for 
small to medium amounts of data the speed of extraction and access to specific segments of data can be hard to 
manage when the volumes get great. If the traffic surveillance system in Tonga employed five quad-copters, and 
they observe traffic behaviours every day but only at peak hours, 3 hours in the morning and 3 hours in the 
evening. Capturing six hours a day of streaming video data from five drones, that’s 823 Gigabytes 250 
Megabytes of video data. If 823,250 is multiplied by 365 days, that’s over 293 Terabytes of data in one year.  
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A FORENSICALLY READY DRONE INFORMATION SYSTEM 
The notion of digital forensic readiness is to meet the objectives for a system that is used in a digital 
investigation to maximise its ability to collect reliable evidence while minimising the cost (Beebe et al., 2005; 
Paganini, 2014). The forensic readiness objectives are designed to: 
a) To gather admissible evidence legally and without interfering with business processes. 
b) To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and disputes that may adversely impact an 
organisation. 
c) To allow an investigation to proceed at a cost in proportion to the incident. 
d) To minimise interruption to the business from any investigation. 
e) To ensure that evidence makes a positive impact on the outcome of any legal action.  
The advantages of forensic readiness planning include: 
Preparing for potential need for digital evidence. If an organisation has to go to litigation and if digital 
evidence is required, electronic evidence is required to be collected and stored in an appropriate manner so 
that it is readily available when requested and can be admissible in the court of law. In this process, incident 
response, disaster recovery and business continuity policies are improved by a forensic readiness policy or 
plan. 
 
Minimising the cost of the investigation. In the case of a drone surveillance system, the evidence is already 
gathered, the investigator needs only to process, analyse and review the video footages. This enables faster 
and more efficient investigation process as a result, the cost of the investigation is minimised and interruption 
to businesses’ normal operation is also minimised. Figure 3 illustrates the systems process architecture. 
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Figure 3: A forensic readiness processes for drone traffic surveillance information system 
The requirement to process big data from a drone surveillance program for traffic conformance can be mitigated 
by an efficient and effective information systems architecture. We propose a structure that is supported by both 
technology and personnel that can efficiently and effectively mine the mountain of data delivered by both 
exception and by archival extraction. Real-time data is most efficiently processed by exception filters and this 
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data can be rapidly transmitted to enforcement officers for further follow-up. Stored data requires both storage 
and mining capabilities. We propose in figure 4 an information systems architecture that maps operational and 
infrastructure readiness onto the response units liable to act on the information. The information itself has been 
categorised before extraction and prepared by due processes that are compliant by law and by policy for its 
usage. Such a system is a necessary addition to any new technologies that may be used for traffic control and 
conformance. 
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Figure 4: Information Systems architecture for drone data 
CONCLUSION 
The study was aimed to fill the identified gap in the literature and in practice by developing an information 
system that is forensically ready to use for drone traffic surveillance in Tonga. The relatively small size of each 
island and the intensity of traffic allowed lightweight and economical quad copters to be used in this research. 
The proposal is innovative and as a prototype has added value to current traffic monitoring and control systems. 
Further research is proposed into the efficient utilisation of the resource so that effective monitoring of vehicle 
behaviour can be achieved within stringent economic constraints for data. The systems reviewed and shown in 
this paper provide a cost-effective solution to the constraints imposed by the problem context. 
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Abstract 
The prevalence of remnant data in second hand storage media is well documented.  Since 2004 there have been 
ten separate papers released through Edith Cowan University alone.  Despite numerous government agencies 
providing advice on securing personal and corporate information, and news articles highlighting the need for 
data security, the availability of personal and confidential data on second hand storage devices is continuing, 
indicating a systemic laissez faire attitude to data security, even in our supposedly cyber security conscious 
world.  The research continues, but there seems to be a lack of correlation of these studies to identify trends or 
common themes amongst the results. The fact that this type of research continues to be conducted highlights the 
deficiencies in the methods used to advertise warnings publicised by Government departments and industry 
experts.  Major media organisations seem reluctant to broadcast these warnings, unless there is a bigger story 
behind the issue. This paper highlights the ongoing issues and provides insight to the factors contributing to this 
growing trend. 
Keywords 
Digital storage devices, remnant data, data recovery, privacy, data sanitisation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Remnant data on second hand devices has been a topic of research since 1996 (Gutmann, 1996).  Over the last 
10 years’ numerous research projects have been completed on this very topic, but to date there has been no 
collective quantitative or statistical evaluation of all the results, to establish the existence of any trends or 
common themes.  Some research has been conducted in consecutive years by the same academics, e.g. through 
Edith Cowan University in 2011, 2012 and 2013 (Szewczyk, Robins, & Sansurooah, 2013; Szewczyk & 
Sansurooah, 2011; Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2012), and while these papers have compared the types and sizes of 
the memory cards purchased, there was no quantitative or qualitative analysis of the data retrieved.  Another 
paper did make some comparisons with six years of research (Jones, Valli, Dardick, Sutherland, & Dabibi, 
2009), but was limited to their own research. 
Digital Storage 
Large volume digital storage media is in great demand and the global market as a whole is predicted to reach 
$6.2 billion by the year 2022 (ReportBuyer, 2015).  Advances in computer technology have lead the world to 
embrace the concept of big data, where more storage is required.  Governments and businesses, have unique 
storage requirements for daily activities and are turning towards the cloud to meet these growing needs.    
Eventually as storage devices become obsolete and if still serviceable, will still have a monetary value.   
2015 saw a decline of -9.2% in the worldwide personal and entry-level hard disk storage market (Li, 2016).  This 
highlights a possible need for the second hand market for the selling of cheap mechanical storage to meet the 
needs of the home based user.  A search for “used” hard disk drives on the popular online auction site eBay 
yielded more than 33,000 listings. Other storage media types are not immune to this. New and used thumb drives 
can differ in price by as much as 900% (eBay, 2016).  This type of division of cost can be found across all the 
different types of storage from flash memory to memory cards to solid state hard drives (SSD).   
Performance, larger capacities and cost are the driving factors in the growth of flash storage focused 
technologies (Bez & Pirovano, 2014).  Flash storage technologies were predicted to increase in size during 2016 
(Sliwa, 2016), this is corroborated by the announcement that Samsung will release a 32TB SSD in 2017 (Shah, 
2016). However, while the cost of SSD Hard Drives remain high, the demand for traditional mechanical drives 
will remain (Bez & Pirovano, 2014). 
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Previous Research 
Edith Cowan University (ECU) has hosted the Australian Digital Forensics Conference since 2006 (ECU, 2016), 
where numerous papers from around the world that detail research into recovered remnant data on second hand 
storage media have been presented.  The following papers, some that where presented at the conference, and 
others that were not, have been analysed in this study: 
 I know what you did last summer… An Investigation into Remnant Data on USB Storage Devices Sold 
in Australia in 2015 (Robins, Williams, & Sansurooah, 2015). 
 Information Security Leakage: A Forensic Analysis of USB Storage Disks (Adam & Clarke, 2014). 
 Analysis of Deletion Habits On Used USB Thumb Drives (Farden & Diesburg, 2014). 
 Sellers Continue to Give Away Confidential Information on Second Hand Memory Cards Sold in 
Australia (Szewczyk et al., 2013a). 
 The 2012 Analysis of Information Remaining on Computer Hard Disks offered for Sale on the Second 
Hand Market in the UAE (Jones, MArtin, & Alzaabi, 2012). 
 The 2012 Investigation into Remnant Data on Second Hand Memory Cards Sold in Australia 
(Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2012b). 
 A 2011 investigation into remnant data on second hand memory cards sold in Australia (Szewczyk & 
Sansurooah, 2011). 
 Data Remanence in New Zealand: 2011(Roberts & Wolfe, 2011). 
 The 2009 Analysis of Information Remaining on Disks Offered for Sale on the Second Hand Market 
(Jones, Valli, Dardick, et al., 2009). 
 The 2009 Analysis of Information Remaining on USB Storage Devices Offered for Sale on the Second 
Hand Market (Jones, Valli, & Dabibi, 2009). 
 The 2008 Australian study of remnant data contained on 2nd hand hard disks: the saga continues (Valli 
& Woodward, 2008). 
 Who is Reading the Data on Your Old Computer (Mee, 2008). 
 An Evaluation of Personal Health Information Remnants in Second Hand Personal Computer Disk 
Drives (Emam, Neri, & Jonker, 2007). 
 Oops they did it again: The 2007 Australian study of remnant data contained on 2nd hand hard disks 
(Valli & Woodward, 2007). 
 An empirical methodology derived from the analysis of information remaining on second hand hard 
disks (Fragkos, Mee, Xynos, & Angelopoulou, 2006). 
Statistical Analysis 
All of the research papers where reviewed and the data was collated.  As shown in Figure 1 of the fifteen 
research papers, eleven have resulted in data retrieval from more than half of the items purchased, with 40% of 
the research resulting in data retrieval from over three quarters of the items purchased. It is interesting to note 
that of all the research, 11 papers recorded attempts to sanitise devices, either by delete, format or repartitioning 
the volumes.  Of these research projects, seven (64%) recorded a sanitisation attempt rate of less than half of the 
items purchased, and five (45%) are below one quarter. 
The quantity of sensitive personal data recovered is also seen as significant (Figure 2), when you consider this as 
potentially facilitating the means to engage in identity fraud.  Corporate data did not fare any better and it is 
concerning to note that there exist companies, including those in the ICT industry that do not have effective 
sanitisation and disposal policies to protect their most valuable commodity – their data.   
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 Figure 1 Statistical analysis of 15 remnant data papers with the X axis shows the year, country and number of 
items purchased 
 
Figure 2 Statistical analysis of 15 remnant data papers with regards to sensitive data types 
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QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Common Themes 
All of the research papers detailed very similar outcomes in relation to the sensitive, personal and corporate 
information that is more than sufficient for identity theft or industrial espionage.  The majority of the research 
papers offered some form of reasoning behind the continuing problem from organisations lacking adequate 
policies, procedures and strategies that deal with the sanitisation of digital storage to the time consuming nature 
of developing and implementing not just the strategies and policies but the education of employees. 
One common theme across the research is the premise that sellers, both corporate and private do not have an 
adequate understanding of how ‘delete’ and ‘format’ actually work, and have little understanding of how to 
correctly sanitise their digital media.  In 2015 Robins, Williams and Sansurooah postulated that conflicting and 
misleading advice currently available on the Internet as one possible cause (Robins et al., 2015).  However, the 
fact remains that not enough is known by the general public on how to sanitise digital storage media.  Figure 2 
shows a steady decline in the amount of corporate data discovered over the 10 years surveyed.  This is possibly 
due to a greater understanding of the problems that exist, however, a number of the research papers show that 
there are still companies that do not take action, as stated in the 2010 Jones, Valli, Dardick, Sutherland and 
Dabibi paper. 
Corporations spend vast amounts on the protection of data in transit and at rest, but when it comes to the storage 
device, there seems to be a lax approach.  Considering the remnant data that potentially exists, it is strange that 
some sellers advertise the item for sale as coming from a corporate or government organisation.  For those who 
deal in industrial secrets, this type of hardware would be a goldmine.  Take for instance data recovered from a 
mining company in Australia during 2008.  This project recovered supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) master plans and passwords, including the Administrator password, as well as photos of the mine site 
and employees (Valli & Woodward, 2008).  Or the data recovered in Australian during the 2015 research, that 
included legal documents, contracts, agreements and offshore gas transportation documents marked “private and 
confidential” (Robins et al., 2015).  Some companies have taken steps to ensure sanitisation, but are relying on 
third party organisations to complete the task.  The risk here is the possibility that some work is substandard and 
leaves remnant data behind. 
The datatypes that are being recovered are consistent across the entire 10 years of surveyed research.  The papers 
detail the recovery of scanned images of passports, travel itineraries and boarding passes.  PayPal and banking 
data, including login credentials and scanned images of credit cards have been discovered in many of the 
projects undertaken. Couple this with the ability to identify sellers from photographs recovered from devices and 
you could have the potential for disastrous consequences to occur for the seller. 
Overall a common theme is that all papers report their results to be consistent with similar studies in previous 
years.  The 2011 research completed in New Zealand found their results to be consistent with international 
research dating back to 2005 (Roberts & Wolfe, 2011), and a 2008 Irish paper reported results consistent with 
other worldwide research and showed that it was not only a problem in Ireland, but the rest of the world (Mee, 
2008). Six years of research with similar results, this shows that education of the masses is either grossly 
ineffective or non-existent. 
Trends 
The statistical analysis shows that overall the amount of data retrieved has increased significantly, even though 
the percentage of data that is seen as ‘readily available’ has remained relatively static throughout the research 
(Figure 1).  Instances of attempts to sanitise devices has steadily increased, which could be part of lack of 
knowledge on how ‘delete’ and ‘format’ work (this data includes successful sensitisations).  An interesting trend 
is the sharp reduction in the faulty items being sold, which was also reported in the 2009 United Kingdom 
Australia paper (Jones, Valli, Dardick, et al., 2009).  
The trends shown in Figure 2 is that the amount of retrievable data of a personal nature has been increasing 
whilst corporate data is steadily decreasing.  Organisations seem to be becoming more aware of implications and 
risks associated with disposing of digital media.  Eight research papers stated that documents relating to 
Government organisations were located at some point in the analysis.  The latest such find was in 2015 where 
the construction plans for an Australian army barracks where located.  This fact is surprising, when you consider 
the requirements of the Australian Privacy Principles imposed on all Australian Government Departments from 
60
2013 (OAIC, 2013) and the advice published by the Australian Signals Directorate in their data sanitisation 
guide (ASD, 2016b). 
One trend shows a degree of laziness on the part of sellers, where they are requesting the buyer to remove their 
data. In 2012 Australian research there were 19 instances where a note requesting the buyer to delete the contents 
of the device was included with the product (Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2012).  This trend continued in the 2013 
Australian research, where a seller supplied a note reporting attempting to remove the data, but was unsure if it 
was successful and some sellers advertising on the auction listing that devices where being “sold as is” and data 
would not be deleted due to time constraints (Szewczyk et al., 2013a).     
Each year that the research is conducted, the average storage size of the purchased second hand items has 
increased, this is especially true for the thumb drives and flash memory.  There are two possible answers to this, 
one being that the cost per gigabyte is reducing and the other possibility is that users are requiring more storage 
space.  With the increase in storage capacity, there has been an increase in the  amount of retrievable data (Jones, 
Valli, Dardick, et al., 2009; Robins et al., 2015).    
Search Engine Query – “How to delete data” 
There is a significant quantity of remnant data being retrieved from second hand devices, and the Robins, 
Williams and Sansurooah paper mentioned the conflicting and misleading advice on the Internet. As a result an 
analysis of available information found on the Internet was undertaken for erasing data.  The searches were 
conducted using Google, Bing, Yahoo and Ask, the top four English language search engines (eBiz, 2016), and 
the browser used was Firefox.  The search term “how to erase data from a thumb drive” was used, with only the 
first page of search results reviewed.   To ensure a clinical response, a generic new user account was created for 
each search engine used and no web accounts logged into. 
 
Table 1 – Search Engine Queries for Data Erasure 
 Google Bing Yahoo ASK 
Delete/Format 
6 Windows 
1 Mac 
5 Windows 5 Windows 4 Windows 
Wipe/Erase 
1 Windows 
1 Mac 
1 Windows 
1 Mac 
2 Windows 
2 Mac 
3 Windows 
2 Mac 
Fill up and delete 1 Windows 1 Windows 1 Windows 1 Windows 
Bad links  2   
Advertisements   5 10 
 
Google 
Ten results were returned.  The first two results were YouTube videos on how to perform a quick format on a 
flash drive.  The video titles were: 
 “How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash Drive Tutorial” (Rivera, 2011) 
 “How to erase all content on USB Flashdrive” (Anthoct104, 2011) 
Two links took the searcher to sites that detailed how to use the erase a thumb drive, one for the Apple OSX 
operating system and the other for Microsoft Windows.  The Windows environment the tools suggested where 
Disk Wipe and CCleaner and MAC users where advised to open Disk Utilities and select “Erase”.  One forum 
site suggested the user fill the drive with junk, then delete the junk and repeat two more times.  Of the remaining 
six results, the sites the user was directed to varied from forum posts to blog style instructions on how to perform 
a delete or format of the device.  The interesting result is the descriptions used across the results, these ranged 
from “how to format” to “how to clear” to “how to delete”. 
Bing 
Ten result were returned.  The first two results were links to a web page and a YouTube video.  The result titles 
where: 
 “Deleting files in your flash drive or memory card using a PC” (SanDisk, 2008)  
 “How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash Drive Tutorial” (Rivera, 2011) 
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While there was only one result returned for Apple OSX based computers, it also detailed the use of the OSX 
Disk Utilities Erase function.  Of the Windows based results, two where links that displayed content errors and 
all of the others had titles that ranged from “permanently delete files” to “How to erase all content” to “How to 
erase a flash drive”. After result number five, Bing displayed a link tilted “Videos of how to erase data from a 
thumb drive”.  It was observed that this link title related directly to the search criteria, and when opened, a large 
number of videos where displayed, again with varying titles that contained the words erase, delete, wipe or 
format.   
Yahoo 
Ten results were returned, along with 5 advertisements for products, reports and tips relating to wiping data from 
a device. The first result was a link to a 2011 YouTube video on how to format a USB drive.  The first link on 
how to erase a device was for an Apple OSX at result number 3 and for a PC at result number 4.  Result numbers 
8 – 10 also described methods for erasing data, including filling the device up with junk and deleting. Yahoo 
provides featured content labelled as “How to erase data from a thumb drive - Yahoo Answers results”.  The 
three items displayed had nothing to do with erasing data from a thumb drive.  
ASK 
Ten results – the first two results matched those of the searches completed using Google, these being: 
 “How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash Drive Tutorial” (Rivera, 2011) 
 “How to erase all content on USB Flashdrive” (Anthoct104, 2011) 
10 advertisements where displayed, five above and below the web results with all advertisements at the top 
repeated at the bottom.  Two advertisements where for products that could erase storage media, however, three 
advertisements where for the recovery of data. Unlike the previous search engines, Ask.com returned six of the 
ten results as relating to the erasure of data, the first of these results being at number 4 on the page. 
Combined Results 
The search engines returned similar content, considering that the 2011 YouTube video is consistently within the 
top two results across all platforms. 
 
Table 2- Common Search Engine Results for Data Erasure 
Result Title 
Position in Results List 
Google Bing Yahoo Ask 
How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash drive Tutorial 1 2 1 1 
How to erase all content on USB Flashdrive 2 7  2 
Deleting files in your flash drive or memory card using a PC 3 1 3 3 
how to clear data from a USB stick on a Mac 4  2  
How to Completely Erase a Memory Stick 5  4 4 
How to Delete the Files on a USB Flash Drive 6 5 6 6 
Permanently delete files from a flash drive 7  9 8 
USB - How do I format my USB Flash Drive on a Mac? 8  8  
data leakage - How do I securely erase USB flash drives 9   10 
How do I erase or wipe an old Flash Drive? 10 10 7 7 
How can I securely erase files from a USB drive  9  9 
How to Delete Everything on a USB Flash Drive   5 5 
 
A large number of search results appear on at least two of the search engines (Table 2). The array of titles 
suggests information about erasure of data, but unsuspecting users are supplied conflicting information.  For 
example, “How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash drive Tutorial” is misleading, as the content is about how to 
format a flash drive and this result is returned as the top option across all platforms.  Of concern is that it was 
posted in 2011 and this poses the question around how and why search engines return particular results. 
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DISCUSSION 
The world as we know it is in the grip of cybercrime epidemic, in 2015 Steve Morgan, writing for Forbes, stated 
“Cyber-attacks are costing businesses $400 - $500 billion per year” (Morgan, 2015).  In 2016 ABC News 
reported that Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting Australian consumers (Taha, 2016).  The threat of 
identity theft is real, and this research indicates that people, corporations and governments are taking minimal or 
no precautions to protect their most valuable asset – their sensitive and identifying data. The research projects 
analysed shows instances of recovering data that could result in the theft of an identity.  The result also showed 
that while the amount of sensitive corporate data recovered is decreasing, it is still being recovered. Consumers 
are constantly told how an organisation was hacked or succumbed to an attack, and the incidents of identity theft 
through the theft of hardcopy mail (Edwards, 2015).  But there seems to be very little heard on the discovery of 
information that can be of value to the identity thief through the recovery of remnant data. 
 
The Australian Signals Directorate has posted information on how to protect data from being divulged (ASD, 
2016b), but this document and the subsequent information is difficult to locate.  In the 2013 Australian research 
project it was reported that eBay no longer provide warnings to sellers on the sanitisation of data from storage 
devices put up for sale (Szewczyk, Robins, & Sansurooah, 2013).  These warnings where reported as being 
provided by eBay in the 2011 Australian paper (Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2011). This may indicate a 
complacency exhibited in the attitudes of the sellers.  Indeed, some private organisations have conducted their 
own research into remnant data.  Avast antivirus company detailed the purchase of 20 used smartphones from 
eBay and the personal data that was recovered from these devices (Hořejší, 2014). Corporate and government 
cloud users have the ability and resources to negotiate the level of control they have over not only the 
sovereignty of their data, but also the level of oversight on the sanitisation of storage media.  The average user 
does not have such an ability, without paying a significant fee. 
CONCLUSION 
Unless there is a serious effort to increase the level the education, the issue of recoverable remnant data will 
continue.  As the world moves in the direction of a paperless office, the information that will become available 
increases exponentially. Many households receive utility bills, bank statements and share dividend statements via 
email. The world’s data holdings stood at 4.4 zettabytes in 2013 and is predicted to grow to 44 zettabytes by 
2020 (Khoso, 2016). This large quantity of data has the potential to encompass a significant portion of personal 
and confidential data that could also end up on the second hand market. This paper has highlighted areas that 
require further research, these being; an in-depth study of how search engines interpret the needs of the user and 
then display relevant links; and the quality of literature and supporting information that is supplied to end-users 
in the public domain. 
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